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NOTES
REGULATING TELEVISED NEWS: A NEW SEASON
FOR THE PUBLIC INTEREST STANDARD
MARK EMERY*
Televised news is not what it used to be. It bombards. Alerts
flash; tickers scroll; well-coiffed men with square jaws point fin-
gers and bark trademarked slogans. Women in short skirts
deliver headlines; animated advertisements for upcoming inter-
views or debates thunder to music. With a click of the remote
control, a cable or satellite subscriber may scroll through a hand-
ful of channels of this new breed of news at any hour of the day.
Only a few news programs soldier on with gray studio panels,
gray hosts.
The news media, in general, is in a deep time of change.'
This Note will address one particular trend in televised
* J.D. Candidate, University of Notre Dame Law School, 2005; ThomasJ.
White Scholar 2003-2005; Ph.D., Yale University. I am deeply grateful to the
talented and dedicated members of the Notre DameJournal of Law, Ethics & Pub-
lic Policy. I also thank Celina Bustamante for her encouragement and her
uncanny wisdom.
1. See Project for Excellence in Journalism and the Committee of Con-
cerned Journalists, The State of News Media 2004: An Annual Report on American
Journalism, at http://wAw.stateofthenewsmedia.org/200 4 (last visited Apr. 9,
2005) (on file with the Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy)
[hereinafter PEJ]. The PEJ found that "journalism is in the middle of an
epochal transformation, as momentous as probably the invention of the tele-
graph or television." Id. at 4. The report notes eight "overarching trends": (1)
A growing number of news outlets are chasing a relatively static or even shrink-
ing audience for news; (2) Much of the new investment in journalism today-
much of the information revolution generally-is in disseminating the news,
not in collecting; (3) In many parts of the news media, we are increasingly get-
ting the raw elements of news as the end product ("This is particularly true in
the 24-hour media"); (4) Journalistic standards now vary even inside a single
news organization; (5) Without investing in building new audiences, the long
term scenario for many traditional news outlets seems problematic; (6) Conver-
gence of media (Internet, newspaper, television) seems more inevitable and
potentially less threatening to journalists than it may have seemed a few years
ago; (7) The biggest question mark may not be technological but economic
(e.g., If Internet news does not prove profitable, will this lead to cutbacks in
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news.2 This trend is characterized by a commercialized blend of
(1) news reporting, (2) editorial programs, i.e. opinion-based
programs on news topics, and (3) advertising by news networks
of news items and their own editorial programs. I will refer to
this trend as the "news/ed/ad mixture." The trend toward a
news/ed/ad mixture is exemplified in the programming of cable
news outlets such as Fox News, MSNBC, and CNN. These net-
works mix news reporting with editorial programs hosted by
strong personalities such as Bill O'Reilly, while aggressively adver-
tising their own news and editorial products. Broadcast networks
CBS, ABC, NBC, and PBS, confronted with competition from
cable networks, must contemplate whether they will follow the
same trend.
The trend toward the news/ed/ad mixture in televised news
has worrisome consequences. Paradoxically, as the number of
news channels available to the public increases, the scope of news
issues covered may narrow. The popularity and comparative
inexpense of editorial programs reduces the incentive for news
networks to put resources into newsgathering and responsible
journalistic treatment of a wide range of news issues. The mar-
keting of the coverage of news items and of editorial program-
ming provides abundant opportunities to attract viewers to a
particular "approach" to news (e.g., "Fair and Balanced"), but
advertising for news and editorial content often has the effect of
reinforcing a small set of popular news stories, rather than broad-
ening exposure of the public to newsworthy issues. At its most
worrisome, advertising of editorial and news programming pro-
motes partisanship. Viewers develop loyalty to a particular news
newsgathering?); (8) Those who would manipulate the press and public appear
to be gaining leverage over the journalists who cover them (e.g., a "seller's mar-
ket" for information). Id. at 5-7. I do not attempt to address all of these issues.
I address themes found in trends (2) -(4) and (7), namely, the shift of resources
from news gathering to dissemination of news, uncertain journalistic standards
for "news," and market constraints on newsgathering.
2. By "televised news," I mean to include both news broadcast over the
airwaves and news delivered by cable and satellite media to general consumers
via television or similar device (unless otherwise specified). The "news" prob-
lem on which I am focused is the effort of companies, whether public or pri-
vate, through television and for at-large viewers, to provide images, information,
opinions, and/or forums about public matters (particularly political, social,
legal, business, and non-technical scientific matters). In shorthand, "televised
news" is the televised form of what has traditionally been called "the press" by
citizens, the media industry, and the First Amendment. See U.S. CONST. amend.
I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of
the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the
Government for a redress of grievances.").
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outlet because it presents the news largely from a single ideologi-
cal viewpoint. When news becomes partisan, both networks and
viewers lose interest in problems and points of view that chal-
lenge moral and policy commitments. We all lose the opportu-
nity to benefit from the creative use of resources and talents that
can be invigorated by a well and widely informed public.
The purpose of this Note is to address whether it is good
policy for the federal government to regulate televised news-for
content-in response to the trend toward the news/ed/ad mix-
ture. The goal of such regulation would be to ensure that the
public has access to news through the televised medium that is
sufficiently wide in scope of issues important to a democratic
public. If so, the task falls to the Federal Communications Com-
mission ("FCC"), to which Congress has delegated the authority
to grant television and radio licenses according to whether licen-
sees promote "the public interest, convenience and necessity."3
FCC regulation of the content of televised news is the best
option available if we want to preserve televised news as a
medium that promotes a just, democratic society. The public's
choice is between government content regulation, with the ever-
present risk of government censorship, or the risk of the private
managerial censorship of new outlets. Without reasonable, gov-
ernment-enforced standards for minimal news content, there is a
risk that managerially censored news will descend into a Roman
circus, a popular public forum where small pieces of important
news are lost in a forum for appetite and entertainment, to the
neglect of serious affairs of state, the marginalized, and
suffering.4
In Part I, I describe, in non-legal terms, the problems with
the current trend in televised news, and why televised news
3. Communications Act of 1934, §§ 307, 309, 47 U.S.C. §§ 307, 309
(2000).
4. Without mass media, the Roman Empire had few occasions to address
the general public all at once. At the circus, between chariot races the Emperor
would announce new laws to a public that usually could not read them for
themselves. Inside the circus, the Emperor would exercise unusual indulgence.
As an understood rule, the public, often drunk and rowdy, could denounce the
Emperor, other officials, or policies with the most scathing and scandalous of
rebukes; such behavior outside the circus would be punishable. The ancient
Roman historian Dio outlined a typical episode in 196 A.D.:
The populace, however, could not restrain itself, but indulged in the
most open lamentations.... [T]hey shouted: "How long are we to
suffer such things?" and "How long are we to be waging war?" And
after making some other remarks of this kind, they finally shouted, "So
much for that," and turned their attention to the horse race.
ROBERT B. KEBRIC, THE RoMAN PEOPLE 233-37 (1993).
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should be regulated by the government. In Part II, I address how
the FCC should regulate televised news and offer two proposals.
The case for FCC's use of these proposals involves three parts.
First, I argue that the FCC needs to move away from the scarcity
rationale for regulation and adopt a "special impact" theory. Sec-
ond, I show that my two proposals have precedent in FCC doc-
trine prior to 1980s deregulation. Third, I outline several ways in
which the risk of government censorship through programming
content regulation can be avoided.
Behind my interest in such FCC regulation is a confessedly
moral goal. I would like to see news networks challenged to ful-
fill their public interest obligations because televised news has
the power to improve the quality of many lives. Televised news-
unlike any other source-can inform and move the public. The
array of resources and talents among members of the public who
learn of issues can be put to use in solving problems. Many long-
range, systematic problems of the poor and suffering, of govern-
ment corruption and abuse, of health and disease, and of envi-
ronmental destruction are underreported. Consequently, talents
and resources that may be committed to these problems are lost.
Reasonable people can differ on what is most important to
be included in news coverage. These differences should not lead
us to neglect the content and quality of reporting. The opportu-
nity to promote any standards at all in televised news coverage is
quickly slipping away. With digital technology, there is a shift
from broadcast to cable and satellite. Thus far, the FCC has not
countered this shift with new regulations. The FCC has pre-
ferred to let "markets decide," and the markets have embraced
many elements of the news/ed/ad mixture. Harnessed and
guided by reasonable content standards, televised news networks
will improve the quality of news coverage and serve the public
interest, rather than minimize and trivialize news coverage as
they devour one another in market competition for advertising
revenues.
I. WHY TELEVISED NEWS NEEDS To BE REGULATED
The heart of this Note is analysis of the FCC's authority to
engage in content regulation of televised news, and why it is
good policy to do so. Before moving to this analysis, however, I
will describe the televised news problem in non-legal terms, in
order to make the case that the problem justifies such regulation.
REGULATING TELEVISED NEWS
A. Televised News Is Powerful
Especially in times of crisis, the power of news networks to
bring vivid pictures, sounds, stories, and engaging people to the
public in short amounts of time is stronger than any other kind
of medium. The government relies on televised news. The pub-
lic relies on televised news. Consider the months following Sep-
tember 11, 2001. Televised news was a galvanizing force. News
reporters became household figures. Televised news played a
large part in writing the story, as through it Americans shared
images, stories, and personalities.
Americans do, of course, consult news media other than
televised news. We go to newspapers, magazines, radio, and
increasingly, online sources.5 But, given current technology,
none of these other news media possess the same galvanizing
properties as televised news. As Owen Fiss has argued, television
is the "paramount public medium" because of its "unique capac-
ity to create a shared understanding."6 Fiss contrasts, for exam-
ple, television and the Internet:
[Television] defines the public. Computerized communi-
cation is private in the sense that citizens use computers to
pursue individually what interests them and also to com-
municate individually with those they already know or want
to know. With television, on the other hand, millions and
millions of families watch the same show or the same news
broadcast, often at the same time. For instance, every week
more than ten million households watch the program 60
Minutes, and more than forty million households tuned in
for the final episode of Seinfeld. Television is unique in its
capacity to produce this type of shared experience and for
that very reason can be regarded, at least today, as the par-
amount public medium.
7
The comparison with newspapers or magazines would lead
to similar conclusions. While newspapers or magazines are
arranged to emphasize certain news issues, one is still at liberty to
5. In 2004, most Americans "regularly" watched local news (59%), read
newspapers (42%), watched network evening news (34%) and network maga-
zine news (22%), watched ESPN (20%), read Time/Newsweek/US News
(13%), listened to National Public Radio (16%), or watched NewsHour (5%).
PEW RESEARCH CENTER FOR THE PEOPLE AND THE PRESS, ONLINE NEWS AUDIENCE
LARGER, MORE DIVERSE 3 (2004), at http://people-press.org/reports/pdf/
215.pdf (on file with the Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy)
[hereinafter Pew Study].
6. Owen M. Fiss, The Censorship of Television, 93 N.W. U. L. REv. 1215, 1217
(1999).
7. Id.
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flip through pages. One can turn away from television or click it
off, but an engaged viewer is shaped by its content in a unique
manner. One shares immediately with millions of others in
watching a televised news program. Only radio comes close in
power, but it lacks the powerful and persuasive capacity to bring
pictures."
The increase in television channels or online sources is
unlikely to disperse this galvanizing effect of television news. As
Fiss notes, even as large numbers of channels become available
to many viewers through cable or satellite, "the costs of gathering
news and producing programs will ensure that a relatively small
number of channels will dominate the spectrum. These channels
will remain the principal institutions that construct the public
agenda and shape public understanding."9
Americans spend a lot of time with the news. Seventy-one
percent of Americans say that they begin their day with some
type of news; over sixty percent watch or listen to news during the
dinner hours."t Taking into account all major media (newspa-
per, television, radio, Internet), the average American spends
sixty-six minutes per day with the news." Of these, forty-nine
minutes are spent on broadcast or cable media (television or
radio).' 2
Televised news persuades, though the public believes less of
the news than it used to believe. Credibility ratings-reflecting
the number of people who respond that they believe "all or
most" of what they see and hear on a channel or program-have
dropped for every broadcast and cable news outlet except for
Fox News since 2002.13 For 2004, the highest credibility ratings
are for CBS' 60 Minutes (33%), followed by CNN (32%); Fox
moved from twenty-five percent to twenty-six percent over the
past two years. 4 These ratings are higher than any print media
8. The public has a preference for "viewing" the news over "reading" it,
rendering broadcast and cable television particularly important. When asked to
choose which way of "getting the news" provides the best understanding of
major news events, fifty-five percent of Americans prefer seeing pictures or
video footage, compared to forty percent who say they learn more from reading
or hearing the facts about what happened. Id. at 30.
9. Fiss, supra note 6, at 1217.
10. Pew Study, supra note 5, at 9-10.
11. Id. at 11.
12. Id. This figure has been fairly stable over the past decade. As a high,
viewers spent an aver-age of seventy-three minutes on news in 1994, and as a low,
they spent fifty-eight minutes per day in 2000. Id.
13. Id. at 40.
14. Id. The credibility of 60 Minutes may fall based on the admission of
CBS in December 2004 that a report done on the military service of George W.
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(led by USA Today at 24%).11 On the whole, fifty-three percent of
the public "agrees" with the statement: "I often don't trust what
news organizations are saying."' 6 Nine percent "completely disa-
gree" with this statement (i.e., they always trust what is on the
news).1 7 Combine these credibility ratings with the fact that the
average American watches or listens to nearly an hour of broad-
cast or cable news per day, and the effect is considerable: tele-
vised news can bend the ear of the thirty percent of the American
population who believe "all or most" of what they hear for nearly
an hour a day.
B. Televised News Is Proprietary: The News/Ed/Ad Mixture
Televised news is becoming more proprietary. Certainly,
news outlets have always been competitive in the sense that they
try to "scoop" one another. Today's televised news outlets-led
by the cable news channels-fashion proprietary blends of (1)
news; (2) editorial opinion shows that feature strong personali-
ties with readily identifiable approaches or opinions on news
items (these opinions usually are not an "official" opinion of the
news channel, but they are marketed as part of the news prod-
uct); and (3) advertising of the outlet's news and editorial prod-
ucts, including everything from "Fox News Alerts" to
advertisements for Scarborough Country. The blend of these three
is what I am calling the "news/ed/ad mixture."
Consider Fox News' humorless 2003 lawsuit against come-
dian Al Franken. Fox sued Franken for trademark infringe-
ment."8 The claims that Fox made in its complaint provided a
revealing look into how a cutting-edge contemporary television
news company views its products. Fox claimed that its trade-
marked slogan "Fair and Balanced" is a "unique" and "distinc-
tive" brand of reporting news.'" The complaint continued by
touting the prominence and uniqueness of its top on-air person-
ality, Bill O'Reilly, and the amount of money it has spent ($61
Bush was based on falsified documents. See CBS Ousts Four Over Guard Story,
CNN, Jan. 17, 2005, at http://www.cnn.com/2005/SHOWBIZ/TV/01/10 /
cbs.guard (on file with the Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy).
15. Pew Study, supra note 5, at 40. By comparison, People magazine has a
seven percent credibility rating and the Enquirer five percent. Id.
16. Id. at 4.
17. Id. at 33.
18. Complaint for Plaintiff, Fox News Network v. Penguin Group and
Alan Franken, No. 602514/2003 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. filed Aug. 7, 2003), at http://
news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/ip/foxpenguin80703cmp.pdf (on file with the
Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy).
19. Id. at 2.
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million since 1998) to promote the "Fair and Balanced"
product.2
0
The Fox suit reveals how closely the networks manage their
mix of personalities, slogans, and images. Editorial "spin" (or
purported lack of it in Fox's slogan for O'Reilly's "No Spin
Zone") is in itself a marketable product. This "spin" is brought
to the viewer through a mixture of news items blended with edi-
torial opinion and bold and integrated self-promotion.
Fox News has set the pace for the new proprietary news. 21
Since 2000, the number of Americans who watch Fox News regu-
larly has increased from seventeen percent to twenty-five percent,
while other networks have been "flat at best. '22 Much of Fox
News' success, however, appears attributable to the growing parti-
sanship of its viewers. Fifty-two percent of Fox's viewers describe
themselves as "conservative," up from forty percent in 2000.23
The partisan split in news viewers is strikingly reflected in credi-
bility ratings by political affiliation. In general, Democrats give a
much higher credibility rating to broadcast and cable (and print
media) than Republicans. Across all of the major broadcast and
cable news channels, Democrats give credibility ratings that are
anywhere from fourteen to nineteen percent higher than Repub-
licans.24 The exception is Fox News, to which Republicans give a
five percent higher credibility rating than Democrats. 25
If Fox News signals a trend toward partisanship, this trend
may still be in its infancy. When asked, forty-five percent of
Americans still view the news media as "pretty much the same to
me."26 Among those with interests in "hard news" (Washington
politics, international affairs, and policy news), however, sixty-six
percent perceive clear distinctions between networks.27 Viewers
20. Id. at 23.
21. Pew Study, supra note 5, at 3 (leading off its annual report overview by
citing the growth of online news and Fox News' growth as an exception to
viewer habits that otherwise have remained "stable" over the past two years); see
also PEJ, supra note 1, at 18 ("Ideology aside, the real 'Fox Effect' in cable is a
new approach to newsgathering, one that relies more on anchors and talk
shows and less on correspondents. Other cable networks have imitated that
approach.").
22. Pew Study, supra note 5, at 1.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 40.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 34.
27. Id. The "hard news" audience identifies themselves as viewers or lis-
teners of the O'Reilly Factor, Rush Limbaugh, the NewsHour, news and busi-
ness magazines, and the Fox News Channel. Id.
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give almost entirely different lists of "most believable" news
sources, depending on political affiliation.
28
Some commentators have begun to raise the question of
whether the striking success of Fox News in boosting ratings
among viewers with a particular political affiliation will force
other networks to adopt a more partisan format.29 The increased
use of flavorful partisan commentators and slogans has proven
effective, and challenged other networks in the full-time news
business.
Thus far, its competitors insist that they will chart their own
courses, citing a commitment to providing "straight" news, and
bucking any trend toward partisan programming."0 But, it is a
28. Republicans list as most believable, in descending order: Fox News
(29%), CNN (26%), 60 Minutes (25%), Wall Street Journal (23%), C-Span
(22%), Local TV (21%); Democrats list: CNN (45%), 60 Minutes (42%), C-Span
(36%), ABC News (34%), CBS News (34%), NPR (33%); Independents: 60
Minutes (29%), CNN (28%), C-Span (26%), U.S. News (26%), NBC News
(24%), NewsHour (24%). Id. at 44.
29. See, e.g., Peter Johnson, Will Fox News' Success Force Competitors to Take
Sides?, USA TODAY, Nov. 21, 2004, available at http://www.usatoday.com/ life/
columnist/mediamix/2004-11-21-media-mix x.htm (on file with the Notre
Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy). Some critics worry that a parti-
san turn in the media will lead televised news to abandon the journalistic aspira-
tion to something like "straight" news. Jay Rosen remarks that "the whole
political scheme that journalists thought they had settled forever with this past
they called 'objectivity' is not working. We don't have a media system that's
aligned well with the more partisan political life of the country. The press will
have to become more political." Id. For more of Jay Rosen's views, posted on
his blog, see PressThink: Ghost of Democracy in the Media Machine, at http://
journalism.nyu.edu/pubzone/weblogs/pressthink (last visited Feb. 22, 2005)
(on file with the Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics &'Public Policy). But, it is
not obvious that the public is more partisan than it ever has been. It is more
likely that the public is responding to a new product. Until recently, no tele-
vised news product has been widely available on the market that offers a combi-
nation of news, opinion, and advertising that provides viewers with news around
the clock, and that reflects-in the tone and content of editorials and advertis-
ing-the viewers' own partisan political leanings.
30. SeeJohnson, supra note 29. CBS News' news chief Andrew Heyward
remarks that Fox "has created an expectation that you can get your news and
have the spicy conversation around it. To present straight news against that
competitor is potentially problematic." Id. Yet, he predicts that the growth of
opinion on cable will define a role for mainstream networks as "a repository of
straight down-the-middle journalism." Id. ABC News President David Westin
recently noted that there are "powerful reasons for the embrace we're seeing of
opinion journalism on TV .... It's vivid. It's entertaining. And let's face it: It's
less expensive." Id. But, he has also insisted that his network intends to give
viewers "more than just opinions. We need to give them solid facts on which to
base their opinions on important issues of the day." Id. CNN's chief Jim Wal-
ton states that "there is no question that opinion and debate can be oftentimes
entertaining and create passions in viewers. But I can emphatically state that
2005]
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caricature of the current televised news market to portray it as a
battle between "straight" news providers and their partisan com-
petitors. None of the major televised news outlets have exhibited
a desire to return to old-fashioned, shoe-leatherjournalism. The
24-hour news networks have followed Fox News in adopting pro-
prietary formats for news coverage that is interspersed with pro-
grams hosted by "personalities" and propelled by more or less
continuous advertising of news coverage and opinion
programs.3 1
Televised news, then, is growing ever more proprietary. The
televised news market is defined by the news/ed/ad mixture and
exhibits some trend toward partisanship. It remains to be seen
whether the trend toward partisanship will last. If it does, this
limits one of the powerful features of televised news-to present
issues to a wide range of viewers in a manner that can begin con-
versations, continue debates, and promote concerted action to
solve problems.
C. The Televised News/Ed/Ad Mixture Narrows the Scope of News
Issue Coverage
The news/ed/ad mixture narrows the scope of issues the
public receives news of through the television medium. Self-
advertising allows a news network to craft an image, which it can
CNN's business is built on being an independent voice. Fortunately for us,
good journalism is good business." Id. MSNBC head Phil Griffin notes Fox,
especially in its talk shows, has a conservative bent, but he adds that his channel
does not intend to provide a political alternative to the conservative Fox net-
work. Id.
31. CNN focuses on the strength of the "CNN brand of news," which it
insists is among the best known and respected among consumer brands of all
kinds. SeeJennifer Pendleton, Cable News Nets Look For Ad Revenue Payoff: Analyst
Take Is that Fox Should See Gains; Retail; DTC Show Promise, ADVERTISING AGE, June
9, 2003, at S6. CNN, selling itself as "The Most Trusted Name in News," pushes
the "hard-news value" of the network, its "upscale audience and its reach." See
Richard Linnett, Holding on to Viewers: CNN, Fox, MSNBC Vie to Stand Out in
Upftont, ADVERTISING AGE, May 5, 2003, at 34. Fox pushes hard with a patriotic
line and aggressive personalities who bring a "Fair and Balanced" perspective
where "We Report, You Decide." MSNBC, co-owned by NBC and Microsoft,
sells its cable offerings alongside its leading broadcast news properties while
emphasizing the entertainment value of its new prime-time lineup. All three
networks depend on pushing high-profile "news personalities." In the spring of
2003, MSNBC was launching programs, "Hardball with Chris Matthews,"
"Countdown with Keith Olbermann," "Jesse Ventura Live," and "Scarborough
Country" with Joe Scarborough. Fox's lineup included: "The O'Reilly Factor,"
"Hannity & Colmes," "On the Record with Greta Van Susteren," and frequent
appearances from Oliver North. CNN presented Paula Zahn, Lou Dobbs, and
Larry King. CNN presents itself as being "more news." Id.
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then sell through stylized half-hour or hour-long editorial pro-
grams, such as "The O'Reilly Factor." Choices of news coverage
are colored by the need for spicy opinion shows and attractive
marketing. What is newsworthy is shaped and refined by repeti-
tion.12 The repeated exposure of news, commentary on news,
and advertising of both the news and the commentary assumes
the appearance, over time, of common-sense. What is "fair and
balanced" shifts, little-by-little, as common-sense shifts.
Advertising of news does much to magnify the impact of
televised news, without helping to fulfill duties to inform the
public. There are scarcely any good reasons to advertise news
items or editorial programs. Often the advertising of news items
"cross-advertises" a network's editorial programs that address the
same news items, bestowing a gloss of importance on issues that
may not be warranted. For example, advertisements urge that it
is important to keep current news updates on the most recent
sensational celebrity trial, because it will be discussed on several
of the opinion programs.
Advertising for editorial programs can, of course, be useful.
Some opinion journalists are better than others; it is reasonable
that the public might develop a predilection for certain personal-
ities and like to know when they will be on the air and what they
will discuss. News outlets have gone too far, however, in the inte-
gration of opinion journalists into the presentation of the news.
Advertising is a major cause of this over-integration.
News outlets may counter by noting the popularity of edito-
rial formats and infer that the popularity of news formats means
that people will watch "more" news. Viewer preferences for news
format do not always amount to responsible news reporting.
Indeed, many of the techniques employed in the news/ed/ad
mixture accord with reported public tastes in news. For exam-
ple, Fox's "Fair and Balanced" product emphasizes the dynamic
of "back-and-forth" debates. The most popular news technique is
the presentation of debates between people with diverging points
of view.3  The "back-and-forth" regimen, however, is easily
manipulated and it can be misleading. In a market where expo-
sure on television news as an "expert" can boost an individual's
career or an institution's reputation, it is not difficult to find con-
tributors who will play parts in small debates. Quick segments
32. PEJ, supra note 1, at 18 (reporting that 68% of segments on cable
were repetitious accounts of previously reported stories without any new infor-
mation; only 5% of revisited stories could be called "follow ups" with new facts).
33. Fifty-five percent of viewers "like" this way of presenting the news. See
Pew Study, supra note 5, at 32.
2005]
748 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 19
(sometimes as few as two minutes) that give the "back and forth"
on issues may appear on their face to be fair or balanced. But,
where the questions raised or diversity of participants in debates
is limited, news networks may impress upon viewers a vision of
public discourse where policy issues are like crosswords puzzles
or other short diversions, rather than parts of complex and sys-
tematic difficulties (as they often are).
After a strong preference for the "back-and-forth" debate,
viewers note that they "like" the news to include "ordinary Ameri-
cans' views" (49%), that news be "enjoyable and entertaining"
(48%), have in-depth interviews (46%) and sometimes be funny(46%). 3" Twelve percent of respondents "disliked" news that
stirs their emotions.35 News coverage that fits these viewer speci-
fications is likely to exclude too much news. Plenty of important
news cannot easily be captured by presenting short debates
between people with different points of view, by consulting the
"ordinary Americans"' views, and making it enjoyable, entertain-
ing, and funny. Many of the problems that afflict the impover-
ished, uneducated, and powerless may be routinely excluded on
the basis of consumer preferences for viewing format. Many
long-term or systematic problems do not receive adequate cover-
age, as they may not be amenable to "back-and-forth" policy
debates; they may not be fun or entertaining; they are remote
from the understanding of the "ordinary American."
Responding to current public tastes in news format makes it
easy for news networks to de-emphasize the more expensive tasks
of newsgathering. The retrieval of hard news is expensive and
difficult. Only a few networks have the resources to do it well,
and the viewing audience benefits more from the fruits of hard
newsgathering than it benefits from opinion shows. Editorials
remain important. Viewers benefit from insightful, engaging
personalities with opinions that illuminate issues. The need for
editorial programming, however, is not as compelling as the
need for wide news coverage. For those who want opinion, a sea
of magazines and blogs are available.
The narrowing of the scope of issues presented through the
televised news medium poses distinct harms. Particularly disad-
vantaged are those who depend on televised news more because
they may lack literacy, resources (e.g., libraries, university classes,
and computers), or simply enough time to research and reflect
on public events. In addition, the narrowing of the scope of
issues limits the range of issues by which the general public-
34. Id. at 32. Responses included "like," "dislike," or "doesn't matter."
35. Id.
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filled with individuals and entities who may hear about a variety
of issues and stories-may be moved or challenged to use
resources and talents to serve the common good. Many of the
best things in American democracy begin from the bottom up,
and televised news has a crucial role to play in informing individ-
uals and entities who can play a variety of roles in the democratic
process.
In order to promote good things from the bottom up, it may
be necessary to have limited and judicious intervention from the
top down. Televised news, as the "paramount public medium" is
uniquely powerful in shaping public agendas. But, through the
use of the news/ed/ad mixture, televised news outlets have
developed an increasingly proprietary conception of the news.
This may have the effect of making the presentation of news par-
tisan. It also has the effect of privileging advertising-amenable
and inexpensive editorial programming over the hard tasks of
newsgathering. Both of these effects lead to a narrowing of the
scope of news issue coverage. This core problem justifies limited
and judicious regulation by the federal government. In the bal-
ance of this Note, I will sketch the case for how the FCC should
address this problem.
1I. How TELEVISED NEWS SHOULD BE REGULATED
I begin by laying out two proposals that address the problem
of the narrowing scope of issue coverage in televised news:
(1) Partition the news/ed/ad mixture. Partitioning involves
keeping news reporting as "pure" as possible by obliging news
outlets clearly to separate editorial programming from news cov-
erage. It also involves reducing the amount and kind of advertis-
ing of news items and of editorial programs.
(2) Develop general guidelines for categories of news issue
coverage that news outlets need to cover in significant depth.
News outlets should, for example, have an obligation to gather
and report news content in several general topic areas within cer-
tain time parameters.
In the United States, the government agency responsible for
implementing such proposals is the FCC. In 1934, Congress del-
egated to the FCC a broad power to promote the "public interest,
convenience and necessity" through the granting and renewal of
licenses to broadcasters.3 6 Government agencies, it has been
observed, come in two kinds: "Deliver the Mail" or "Holy Grail."
3 7
36. 47 U.S.C. §§ 307, 309 (2000).
37. Erwin G. Krasnow & Jack N. Goodman, The "Public Interest" Standard:
Search for the Holy Grail, 50 FED. COMM. L.J. 605, 606 (1988) (quoting Taylor
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Some agencies have neutral, mechanical, logistical functions,
while others pursue a "more controversial and difficult mandate
to realize some grand, moral, civilizing goal.""8 Because of the
public interest standard, the FCC is decidedly of the latter kind.
The courts have given substantial deference to the FCC in imple-
menting this standard. 9 Few independent regulatory commis-
sions operate under such a broad grant of power with so few
substantive guidelines.4 °
The two proposals I have set out here would require the
FCC to use its "Holy Grail" powers in a manner to which it has
grown unaccustomed. Partitioning news from editorial and
advertising of news, and establishing category-based guidelines
Branch, The Culture of Bureaucracy: We're All Working for Penn Centra4 WAsH.
MONTHLY, Nov. 1970, at 8, 20).
38. Id. at 605.
39. See FCC v. WNCN Listeners Guild, 450 U.S. 582, 596 (1981) (quoting
FCC v. Nat'l Citizens Comm'n for Broad., 436 U.S. 775, 810 (1978).
Our opinions have repeatedly emphasized that the Commission's judg-
ment regarding how the public interest is best served is entitled to substantial
judicial deference .... The Commission's implementation of the public-interest
standard, when based on a rational weighing of competing policies, is not to be
set aside.., for "the weighing of policies under the 'public interest' standard is
a task that Congress has delegated to the Commission in the first instance .... "
Id. Justice Scalia has cited the public interest standard as an example of how far
the Court will go in sustaining broad congressional delegations. See, e.g., Mis-
tretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 416 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Whit-
man v. Am. Trucking Ass'n, 531 U.S. 457, 474 (2001) (citing NBC v. United
States, 319 U.S. 190, 216-17 (1943)).
40. There has long been debate over whether the FCC's public interest
standard exceeds congressional delegation powers. See, e.g., Ernest Gellhorn,
Returning to First Principles, 36 AM. U.L. REv. 345, 347 (1987) (arguing that
"[s] tatutes that allow administrators to determine what is in the 'public interest,
convenience or necessity' simply fail as exercises of power . . .because they
leave basic normative issues unanswered and thus within the realm of the dele-
gate"); see also Gary Lawson, Delegation and The Constitution, 22 REGULATION 2,
23, 29 (1999), available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/regulation/regv22n2/
delegation.pdf (identifying the FCC's public interest standard as "easy kill num-
ber one" among statutory provisions that should be struck down for over-
breadth). The public interest standard has been challenged on the grounds
that Congress's permission to let the FCC enforce the "public interest" violates
the separation of powers because it is an unconstitutional delegation of the
legislative role. See RandolphJ. May, The Public Interest Standard: Is It Too Indeter-
minate To Be Constitutional?, 53 FED. COMM. LJ. 427, 453 (2001) (arguing that
the "public interest" is so vague that "it can mean whatever three FCC commis-
sioners say it means on any given day"). May predicts the courts may try to
reign in the FCC's use of the public interest standard, because "it is not too
much to ask that lawmakers assume responsibility for making the most funda-
mental and basic policy judgments." Id. While these judgments may remain
somewhat general, that "is far better than a delegation that provides no mean-
ingful guidance at all." Id. at 455.
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for news issue coverage would involve the FCC in a brand of pro-
gramming content regulation that it has not exercised since the
late 1970s.
The deregulation of the early 1980s brought massive
changes to the FCC. Ronald Reagan was the first President in
history to appoint FCC Commissioners "whose primary objective
was to eliminate FCC regulations. '"41 Reagan's appointment as
FCC chairman, Mark Fowler, brought with him the presumption
that broadcasting is a business, like any other, and that the FCC
should let the business be subject to market forces, as was prefer-
able in any other venue. Fowler thought of television as 'just
another appliance . . . a toaster with pictures."4" His approach
was to allow the market to regulate broadcasting. The FCC
"should, so far as possible, defer to a broadcaster's judgment
about how best to compete for viewers and listeners, because this
serves the public interest."4 3 The days of FCC efforts to discern
the public interest, in Fowler's view, should come to an end with
respect to content regulation.4 4 The FCC should defer to broad-
casters' judgment. In turn, broadcasters would respond to mar-
ket demand: "[T] he public's interest must determine the public
interest."4 5
Over the early 1980s, the FCC jettisoned many of its policies
that included content regulation, but not all of them. In recent
years, the regulation of indecency and obscenity in broadcasting
and cable has become a major preoccupation of the FCC.4 6 The
FCC has demonstrated that when it wants-especially at the
prodding of outraged football-watching parents or Grammy
watchers with tender ears-it can act swiftly and forcefully to
impose fines for particular content. When Janet Jackson
exposed a breast during the Super Bowl halftime show, the FCC
acted promptly to censure the TV networks, and to implement
41. JONATHAN W. EMORD, FREEDOM, TECHNOLOGY AND THE FIRST AMEND-
MENT 233 (1991); see also Mark S. Fowler & Daniel L. Brenner, A Marketplace
Approach to Broadcast Regulation, 60 TEX. L. REv. 207 (1982).
42. Bernard Nossiter, The FCC's Big Giveaway Show, NATION, Oct. 26, 1985,
at 402.
43. Mark S. Fowler, The Public's Interest, 56 FLA. BARJ. 213, 213 (1982).
44. See generally Wilfred C. Rumble, Note, The FCC's Reliance on Market
Incentives To Provide Diverse Viewpoints on Issues of Public Importance Violates the First
Amendment Right To Receive Critical Information, 28 U.S.F. L. REv. 793, 831 (1994).
45. Fowler, supra note 43, at 216; see also FCC v. WNCN Listeners Guild,
450 U.S. 582 (affirming FCC's authority to use "market forces" to determine the
public interest).
46. See Stephen Labaton, Powell To Step Down from F. C. C. After Pushing for
Deregulation, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22, 2005, at Al.
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new policy.4 7 When singer Bono uttered "fucking brilliant" at an
awards show, the FCC first forgave him, and later reversed itself
in a moment of anguish.4"
Thus, the FCC's stance toward content regulation is not one
of total renunciation. Rather, the kind of content regulation the
FCC should pursue involves a tug-of-war of values. There is no
doubt that the FCC's preoccupation with indecency and obscen-
ity springs from a response to strong moral concerns among vot-
ers. One of the reasons the FCC has, against its general
deregulatory trend, persisted in policing for indecency and
obscenity is because of the prodding of Congress.
As I argued in Part I, however, strong moral reasons also
exist for ensuring that the public receives access to quality news
on a wide scope of issues. For the FCC to return its focus to
news, however, many other things would need to change. The
FCC would need to find reasons to advance content-based regu-
lations farther, perhaps, than it has ever taken them. In the past,
the FCC found reasons under the scarcity rationale to limit the
use of editorials and advertising in broadcast news coverage and
to require television stations to undertake significant efforts to
ascertain and cover important public issues. As several of the
major news networks are now produced for cable and satellite,
rather than broadcast transmission, however, the FCC would
need to extend its jurisdiction significantly in order to reach the
programming content of, for example, Fox News, MSNBC, or
CNN. The FCC has been willing to take this step with respect to
indecency and obscenity, but it is unclear whether it would for
the regulation of televised news. It would involve nothing less
than a new season for the FCC's use of the public interest
standard.
To put the alternatives starkly, we must ask whether the dis-
play of indecency and obscenity is a more serious problem than
the content of televised news. I believe that the problem of the
quality of news coverage, especially in its televised form, is a more
fundamental problem. Furthermore, it is a problem that, unlike
the policing of indecency and obscenity, the FCC is specially
47. Frank Ahrens & Lisa de Moraes, FCC Is Investigating Super Bowl Show:
Halftime Performance Faces Indecency Standards Test, WASH. PosT, Feb. 3, 2004, at
A01, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A5746-
2004Feb2? (on file with the Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public
Policy).
48. Paul Davidson, Crackdown on Cursing Starts with Bono, USA TODAY,
Mar. 8, 2004, available at http://www.usatoday.com/money/media/2004-03-08-
bonox.htm (on file with the Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public
Policy).
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qualified to address. The Justice Department can police inde-
cency and obscenity. But, since its earliest days, the FCC has rec-
ognized that its charge to regulate according to the public
interest involves posing basic questions about the health of Amer-
ican democratic life. While important, indecency and obscenity
do not rise to the same level.
The new season for the FCC's use of the public interest stan-
dard would involve three main tasks, and the remainder of this
section will take them up in turn.
First, it is necessary to figure out under what theory, if any,
the FCC can regulate things that are crucially important to the
public interest such as televised news, regulate them across
broadcast, cable, and satellite technologies, and regulate consist-
ently with the intent of Congress and the First Amendment.
Second, it is necessary to figure out where, if anywhere,
there is a basis in FCC doctrine for regulating televised news.
Third, it is necessary to figure out how, going forward, per-
missible regulations of televised news can be implemented with
the least risk of government censorship.
A. Reconsidering the Theory That Justifies FCC Content Regulation
In 1960, Newton Minow stepped to the podium as the new
Chairman of the FCC to address the National Association of
Broadcasters. He challenged them to watch television for an
entire day. "I can assure you that you will observe a vast waste-
land," he remarked; "The people own the air .... For every hour
that the people give you, you owe them something. I intend to
see that our debt is paid with service."" Minow was stating the
classic "scarcity" interpretation of the public interest standard-
broadcasters owe service to the public in return for the use of
limited airwaves.
In 1998, the Gore Commission issued its report on the pub-
lic interest obligations of digital television broadcasters, begin-
ning with a statement that echoed Minow's: "As this Nation's
1600 television stations begin to convert to a digital television for-
mat, it is appropriate to re-examine the social compact between
broadcasters and the American people."5 ° The Gore Commis-
49. James L. Baughman, Minow's Viewers: Understanding the Response to the
"Vast Wasteland" Address, 55 FED. COMM. L.J. 449, 450 (2003) (quoting Newton
N. Minow, Television and the Public Interest, Speech Before the National Asso-
ciation of Broadcasters (1961)).
50. See ADVISORY COMM. ON PUB. INTEREST OBLIGATIONS OF DIGITAL TELE-
VISION BROADCASTERS, CHARTING THE DIGITAL BROADCASTING FUTURE, FINAL
REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC INTEREST OBLIGATIONS OF DIGI-
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sion's charge was to consider both how traditional public interest
standard obligations applied to digital television, and whether
there are any new obligations that arise.5 Ultimately, the Com-
mittee offered several recommendations that affirmed older
commitments to education, diversity, and disclosure of efforts to
fulfill obligations.5 2 But, there was no consensus recommenda-
tion on new rules." The report acknowledged that the public
interest obligations that followed from the social compact
between broadcasters and the public were more difficult to fig-
ure out than they used to be: "[T] he vast new range of choices in
digital television makes it impossible to transfer summarily
existing public interest obligations to digital broadcasting."5 4
While the Gore Commission entitled its report "Charting the
Digital Broadcasting Future," it did not take the steps to ponder
what theory supported those steps; it concluded that the basis of
public interest obligations is still found in the scarcity rationale. 55
TAL TELEVISION BROADCASTERS xi (1998), available at http://www.ntia.doc.gov/
pubintadvcom/piacreport.pdf (on file with the Notre Dame Journal of Law,
Ethics & Public Policy) (hereinafter Gore Commission Report]. President Clin-
ton initiated the Advisory Committee on Public Interest Obligations of Digital
Broadcasters to consider the public interest responsibilities of television provid-
ers in the digital age. Known popularly as the Gore Commission, the commit-
tee brought together heads of the television industry and numerous experts in
the field, such as Leslie Moonves, Norman Ornstein, and Newton Minow
himself.
51. Id.
52. The Advisory Committee found that the public interest must be
served with respect to six categories: diversity of programming, political dis-
course, localism, children's educational programming, access for persons with
disabilities, and equal employment opportunity. See id. at 18-33. The Commit-
tee did not make televised news an important focus, though it did include rec-
ommendations for news as part of its "Voluntary Code of Conduct." The
Commission made the following specific recommendations about news: (1) cov-
erage should be "both substantive and well-balanced"; (2) inessential morbid,
sensationalistic, or alarming details should be avoided, especially with regard to
crime and sex; (3) news reporting should be factual, fair, and without bias; (4)
broadcasters should exercise "particular discretion" in acceptance, placement,
and presentation of advertisements during news broadcasts, so that advertise-
ments are distinct from news content; (5) commentary and analysis should be
clearly identified as such; (6) pictoral content should be chosen careful to avoid
misleading, prurient, or sensationalist content; (7) interview programs should
be governed by accepted standards ofjournalism; (8) stations should make "an
effort to devote enough time to public issues to permit genuine understanding
of problems and disagreements." Id. It is useful to remember that the work of
the Gore Commission, from 1997-98, slightly pre-dated the rise of the 24-hour
news networks.
53. Id. at xv.
54. Id. at xiii.
55. See id. at xii.
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While scarcity has been the dominant rationale for FCC
authority over broadcasting, it is not the only theory available. In
fact, within the generous space afforded by Congress to the FCC
under the public interest standard, the courts have sustained at
least three theories that support granting less First Amendment
protection to broadcasters than to other forms of mass communi-
cation: scarcity, pervasiveness, and special impact.
The scarcity theory postulates, specifically, that the electro-
magnetic spectrum that enables the broadcast of radio or televi-
sion is a scarce resource, and since chaos results from the
attempt to broadcast on the same channels, the government is
needed to regulate broadcasting. Since companies licensed by
the government gain lucrative use of a scarce resource, the gov-
ernment may demand that licensees fulfill obligations to the pub-
lic in return for use of those airwaves.5 6
The Court has also used the scarcity rationale to give the
FCC authority-d la Minow-as a trustee of the public interest."
Under this theory, the First Amendment is a collective right in
which "the right of viewers and listeners . .. not the right of
broadcasters... is paramount."'58 The FCC and the Court must
balance broadcasters' editorial discretion against the public's
interest in information. Where increased editorial discretion
would lead to better informatiofi, courts will uphold the right of
the broadcaster.5 9 As a further corollary, the Court has held that
the airwaves are public domain, and that consequently the FCC
can lay down ground rules.6"
The fundamental legal framework that still governs the broadcast
industry, based on the notion of "spectrum scarcity," sets it apart from
other media. Congress has mandated that licensees serve as "public
trustees" of the airwaves. Broadcasters have affirmative statutory and
regulatory obligations to serve the public in specific ways. The U.S.
Supreme Court has upheld the public trustee basis of broadcast regu-
lation as constitutional.
Id.
56. NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943) (upholding FCC's early
radio network regulations).
57. Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 388 (1969); CBS v. FCC,
453 U.S. 367 (1981).
58. Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 390.
59. See, e.g., Columbia Broad. Sys. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm'n, 412 U.S.
94, 102 (1973); FCC v. WNCN Listener's Guild, 450 U.S. 582, 604 (1981); Red
Lion, 395 U.S. at 393.
60. Democratic Nat'l Comm'n, 412 U.S. at 101; see also 47 U.S.C. § 309(h)
(2000) (codifying view that airwaves are public domain).
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A second theory, arising largely from the Supreme Court's
landmark ruling in FCC v. Pacifica Foundation,6" reasons that since
radio and television broadcasts have a "pervasive presence" in
American life that may harm certain persons (especially chil-
dren), broadcasters may be regulated by the government. The
Court based its reasoning on a right of privacy in one's home or
car.6 2 Where broadcast signals may enter a home or car without
notice, the government may have an interest in regulating broad-
casts for indecent language, for example, an interest in protect-
ing children from indecent language.6 3
Finally, the Court has also sustained FCC regulations on the
grounds that broadcasting has a "special impact" on viewers. The
basic premise of the impact theory is that television can be regu-
lated because it has a unique power to affect the public; in partic-
ular, it has the capacity to shape the public's views of important
social and political topics. For example, under the special
impact theory, the FCC can obligate a broadcaster to air anti-
smoking commercials, because the impact of pro-smoking adver-
tisements on a "captive audience" is so strong that the public
interest is served by letting the public hear arguments against
smoking.6 4
Each of these three theories has shortcomings. The critics
of the scarcity doctrine are numerous, and their arguments grow
more compelling with developments in technology. Christopher
Yoo, for example, argues that with the development of cable and
satellite television, scarcity is no longer a reality for viewers.65
The broadcast model, based in the scarcity of electromagnetic
waves, has become a "regulatory scheme in search of its own justi-
fication," and the "decades-long ordeal" to settle the First
Amendment standard to govern cable television and digital tele-
vision will lead to yet further regulation that violates the First
Amendment.6 6 Yoo contends that the efforts of the Gore Com-
mission, Cass Sunstein, Owen Fiss, and others are revisionist
attempts to recapture a technology-specific rationale for regula-
61. 438 U.S. 726, 748 (1978) (upholding sanctions against Pacifica for
airing George Carlin's indecent "Dirty Words" monologue because it was acces-
sible by children without notice).
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Banzhafv. FCC, 405 F.2d 1082, 1100-01 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
65. See generally Christopher S. Yoo, The Rise and Demise of the Technology-
Specific Approach to the First Amendment, 91 GEO. L.J. 245 (2003).
66. Id. at 356.
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tion and extend them to current conditions, though the technol-
ogy no longer warrants them."
The pervasive presence theory has always been limited in
explanatory power. It works best to support the FCC's regulation
of obscenity and indecency. If our idea of the public interest is
broader than the regulation of obscenity and indecency, then
the theory does not explain much. The idea that broadcasting
can enter into a home unexpectedly does not support other
kinds of regulation based on content. The Supreme Court con-
tinues to use the pervasive presence rationale but has shown little
inclination to extend it.6" The pervasive presence theory contin-
ues to be the basis for FCC content regulation of indecency and
obscenity regulation, though some believe Pacifica's reasoning
will not support regulation of cable and satellite television.
69
It is the last theory, the special impact theory, that is most
inviting as a continuing basis for FCC regulation of television
under the public interest standard. It is largely harmonious with
the pervasive presence doctrine, except that it applies to all view-
ers, rather than only vulnerable viewers. In contrast to the scar-
city doctrine, which renders broadcasting unique because of a
particular and increasingly outmoded technological novelty, the
special impact theory enables a full comparison between televi-
sion and other media. While it may not be easy, it is possible to
make reliable estimates of whether television affects viewers more
profoundly than, for example, radio or a newspaper. Further, it
permits distinctions within a medium. Just as there are meaning-
ful distinctions between magazines and newspapers as print
media, there are meaningful distinctions between news programs
and prime time television dramas. Finally, the theory provides a
much needed common starting point for considering why televi-
sion should be regulated regardless of how it is delivered-by
broadcast, cable, or satellite. The scarcity rationale, the Supreme
Court has ruled, does not apply to cable.7v
67. Id.; see also Fiss, supra note 6; CASS R. SUNSTEIN DEMOCRACY AND THE
PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH (1993).
68. Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727,
744-47, 755-59 (1996) (applying pervasive presence theory and holding that
cable operators may prohibit sexually explicit content on leased access chan-
nels, but that prohibiting indecent or obscenity material on public access chan-
nels and use of "segregate and block" provision violated First Amendment).
69. Fox is preparing a challenge to an FCC fine levied for alleged inde-
cency on its program "Married by America." See Frank Ahrens, Fox Calls For
Court Review of Standards, WASH. POST., Dec. 4, 2004, at E01.
70. See Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622 (1994) (refusing to apply
the scarcity rationale to cable television).
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The special impact theory is not without difficulties. First, it
runs counter to basic principles of First Amendment law. Ordi-
narily, the First Amendment is held to protect speech, even
where the speech has a strong impact. Speech is not punished
for being strong, powerful, and persuasive. Second, the theory
can provide a "dangerously amorphous justification for regula-
tion" because it provides "no clear limits to official authority and
invites censorship as well as affirmative regulation., 7 1 Third, it is
difficult to judge impact. Is impact judged simply by viewership?
By credibility? Descriptively? Or some other indicia? Finally,
there is always the possibility that we may overestimate the nov-
elty of a feature of television or a trend in programming and reg-
ulate too hastily.
All of these criticisms are forceful, and they descend on a
core concern: the special impact theory is an incomplete theory.
That is, the observation that television or some other media has a
strong impact on viewers does not do enough work to help us
draw the difficult lines we must draw between speech that is
strong but not worth regulating and speech that needs to be reg-
ulated because it is strong, or between harmful and not harmful
strong speech. If the special impact theory simply says that wher-
ever television exerts significant power and persuasion then it
must be regulated, it is surely overbroad.
I think it is possible to concede that the special impact the-
ory is incomplete, but that it is worth keeping. It guides us to
consider dimensions of televised media that we may miss other-
wise, but it must be buttressed by another theory that helps draw
the lines necessary to prevent it from becoming an amorphous
invitation to censorship.
There will be disagreements about what, if any, theory is
appropriate to buttress the special impact theory. It is not within
the scope of this Note to offer a full defense of an argument to
support the special impact theory. As a starting place, I would
point to a group of authors and Supreme Court opinions that
rank the enhancement of the democratic process highly or high-
est among the values enshrined in the First Amendment.7 2
71. Lee C. Bollinger, Jr., Freedom of the Press and Public Access: Toward a
Theory of Partial Regulation of the Mass Media, 75 MICH. L. REv. 1, 15 (1976).
72. See ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM (1948); Robert Bork,
Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. LJ. 1 (1971); Fiss,
supra note 6; SUNSTEIN, supra note 67; Cass R. Sunstein, Television and the Public
Interest, 88 CAL. L. REV. 499, 503-04 (2000); William J. Brennan, The Supreme
Court and the Meiklejohn Interpretation of the First Amendment, 79 HARv. L. REv. 1
(1965); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 376 (1927) (Brandeis, J., dissent-
ing); Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945); New York Times Co.
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The argument, in brief, would be that television has a special
impact on viewers, and televised news has a special impact on a
democratic polity. The manner in which a televised medium
shapes the news, and what it leaves out, impacts the democratic
process. The government can regulate televised news, despite
the limitations of the First Amendment, because, in Justice
Black's words, the First Amendment "rests on the assumption
that the widest possible dissemination of information from
diverse and antagonistic sources is essential to the welfare of the
public."7 3
The few cases that have relied on the special impact theory
have applied it to situations where there is a risk that the wealthy
and powerful will dominate public discourse through repetition
of messages to "captive" audiences. In Banzhaf, the D.C. Circuit
upheld an FCC ruling that licensees must devote a significant
amount of time to anti-smoking commercials on the rationale
that pro-smoking advertisements made such an impact on view-
ers that the FCC could mandate an answer to them. 4 Answering
the objection that the FCC cannot regulate the content of pro-
grams, the D.C. Circuit stated that "neither courts nor Commis-
sion have thought it had to make its decisions among competing
applicants blindfolded to the content of their programs."75 The
court clarified its basis for the content regulation:
Written messages are not communicated unless they are
read, and reading requires an affirmative act. Broadcast
messages, in contrast, are "in the air." In an age of omni-
present radio, there scarcely breathes a citizen who does
not know some part of a leading cigarette jingle by heart.
Similarly, an ordinary habitual television watcher can avoid
these commercials only by frequently leaving the room,
changing the channel, or doing some other such affirma-
v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). One may contrast this "democratic process"
with the "truth" perspective identified with Oliver Wendell Holmes and John
Stuart Mill, and the "autonomy/realization" perspective identified with Redish.
73. Associated Press, 326 U.S. at 20.
74. Banzhafv. FCC, 405 F.2d 1082, 1100-01 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
75. Id. at 1094-95
If agency power to designate programming "not in the public interest"
is a slippery slope, the Commission and the courts started down it too
long ago to go back to the top now unless Congress or the Constitu-
tion sends them. But Congress has apparently specifically endorsed
this understanding of the public interest. And whatever the limits
imposed by the First Amendment, we do not think it requires eradicat-
ing every trace of a programming component from the public interest
standard.
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tive act. It is difficult to calculate the subliminal impact of
this pervasive propaganda, which may be heard even if not
listened to, but it may reasonably be thought greater than
the impact of the written word.76
Thus, the impact of television on "an ordinary habitual tele-
vision watcher" was an adequate justification to regulate adver-
tisements on the basis of content.
The Supreme Court drew upon Banzhaf s language and rea-
soning in the high profile CBS v. Democratic National Committee.7 7
The Court upheld an FCC ruling that the Fairness Doctrine-
which required free air-time for responses to on-air attacks-did
not require CBS to air political advertisements critical of the
Nixon administration.7" The Commission, the Court held, was
entitled to take into account "the reality that in a very real sense
listeners and viewers constitute a captive audience."7 9 The Court
rejected the lower court's conclusions that the FCC acted pater-
nalistically and discriminatorily in denying the Democratic
National Committee advertising access."0 The FCC was justified
in concluding that "the public interest in providing access to the
marketplace of 'ideas and experiences' would scarcely be served
by a system so heavily weighted in favor of the financially afflu-
ent, or those with access to wealth."8 Moreover, there was "sub-
stantial danger" that the time allotted for editorial advertising
could be monopolized by those of one political persuasion.8 2
Importantly, the Court demonstrated in Democratic National
Committee that, on these facts, the special impact theory trumps
the well-entrenched scarcity doctrine. In fact, the special impact
theory even limited political speech in this instance. The Court
subjugated the operation of the Fairness Doctrine, grounded in
the scarcity doctrine, to an overriding concern with the conse-
quences of a policy that would permit the rich, influential, and
politically powerful to dominate the airwaves. "With broadcast-
ing, where the available means of communication are limited in
both space and time," the Court stated, "the admonition of Pro-
fessor Alexander Meiklejohn that 'what is essential is not that
everyone shall speak, but that everything worth saying shall be
76. Id. at 1100-01.
77. CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973).
78. Id. at 128.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 130-31.
81. Id.
82. Id.
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said' is peculiarly appropriate."8" The Court affirmed that the
FCC is justified in saying "no" to the wealthy and politically pow-
erful who seek to profit from rules (Fairness Doctrine) made to
benefit those who are not so easily heard.
Banzhaf and Democratic National Committee both apply the spe-
cial impact theory where wealth and power are likely to dominate
speech in a medium that creates a special impact on viewers or
listeners. Accordingly, televised news should continue to receive
less First Amendment protection than newspapers, the Internet,
and perhaps even radio, not because they are "scarce," or "perva-
sive," but because of the kinds of reasons cited in Banzhaf or Dem-
ocratic National Committee. Viewers are a "passive" and "captive"
audience; the ability of particular advertisers, political parties, or
other individuals or entities to gain regular access to the televised
forum creates a situation where it is less likely that "everything
worth saying" can be said.
That Banzhaf arose in the context of advertising suggests that
there may be some overlap in intuition between the special
impact theory and the commercial speech doctrine.8 4 That is,
there is less First Amendment protection for commercialized
speech; indeed, the government may regulate such speech where
it harms the public by misrepresentation. Television may receive
less First Amendment protection because its speech may be
harmful or misleading; since it has properties that make it har-
dier than other kinds of speech, there is not the risk that televi-
sion's speech will be "chilled" by regulation.8 5
83. Id. at 122 (quoting MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 72, at 26 (1948)).
Meiklejohn's work exercised a strong influence on the Supreme Court's First
Amendment jurisprudence. See Brennan, supra note 72. The Court here
adopts, at least in part, Meiklejohn's worries about the dominance of public
discourse by commercial interests. See MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 72, at 163 ("The
commonly urged identification of Constitutional freedom with the freedom of
business enterprise is an illusion which could be entertained only in a society
which is too busy in seeking success to give time or energy to finding out what
success is.").
84. Several important Supreme Court commercial speech decisions have
approvingly cited Banzhaf for the proposition that the government may enforce
greater restrictions on commercial speakers in the electronic media. See Cent.
Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 570-71 (1980);
Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S.
748, 771-72 n.24 (1976); Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 825 (1975).
85. My argument here is not that television news providers ought to be
regulated under the commercial speech doctrine; that is unnecessary because
broadcasters already receive less First Amendment protection than commercial
speakers. Some of the intuition behind the commercial doctrine is applicable
here, however, and the relation of news to the commercial speech doctrine
provides another example of the unique relationship of televised news under
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the First Amendment. The connection between televised news and commercial
speech arose recently in an interesting context. In 2003, the Supreme Court
took an appeal from the California Supreme Court in the widely publicized case
of Nike v. Kasky. In Nike, a group of plaintiffs brought suit for injunction and
damages against athletic apparel giant Nike, claiming that it made public state-
ments regarding its labor practices in Asia that were misleading under state law.
Kasky v. Nike, 45 P.3d 243 (Cal. 2002). The California Supreme Court upheld a
verdict for the plaintiffs. Many expected that Supreme Court would use the
case to resolve the uncertain law surrounding the commercial speech doctrine,
but ultimately the Court declined to hear the case. Nike v. Kasky, 537 U.S. 1099
(2003), cert. dismissed as improvidently granted, 539 U.S. 654 (2003). The major
television news outlets took a keen interest in the Nike case and filed amicus
curiae. See Brief Amici Curiae of Thirty-Two Leading Newspapers, Magazines,
Broadcasters, and Media-Related Professional Associations (Listed on the Inside
Cover) In Support of Petitioners, Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 537 U.S. 1099 (2003) (No.
02-575). Included among the amici were ABC, CBS, Cable News Network, Fox,
National Association of Broadcasters, and the National Broadcasting Company.
The brief contends that upholding the California Supreme Court's decision
would inhibit the media's ability to report on issues of public concern regard-
ing corporate America. Noticeably absent from the amicus brief, however, is
self-consciousness on the part of the media that they themselves may be part of
the corporate America whose statements about its own products (e.g., "Fair and
Balanced" news) may be at risk. No Supreme Court case has yet considered the
conduct of a major media outlet as commercial speech. But, the intuition
behind the commercial speech doctrine may be applied to the lucrative com-
merce in televised news. The intuition is that certain statements by television
news companies regarding its news product may be false or misleading, and
these labels may be harmful to the public. Recently, Common Cause and
MoveOn.org, Inc. filed a petition with the FTC alleging that Fox's claim to be
"Fair and Balanced" is a deceptive trade practice. See Letter from Wes Boyd,
President and Founder, MoveOn.org, Inc., and Chellie Pingree, President,
Common Cause, to Division of Enforcement, Bureau of Competition, Federal
Trade Commission Uuly 19, 2004), available at http://cdn.moveon.org/con-
tent/pdfs/ftcfiling.pdf (on file with the Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics &
Public Policy).
Televised news confounds the categories of the commercial speech doc-
trine. The Supreme Court has offered two reasons for providing less First
Amendment protection for commercial speech than other kinds of protected
speech. First, commercial speech can be expected to be more objective than
noncommercial speech because its truth is more easily verifiable. Va. Pharmacy
Bd., 425 U.S. at 772. A speaker may be held to a higher standard under regula-
tions if it is easier for the speaker to find out accurate information. Thus,
where a speaker must dig information out of recalcitrant or unreliable sources,
the speaker cannot be held to as high of a standard. Virginia Pharmacy uses the
news as an example of speech that cannot fall under the commercial speech
doctrine:
The truth of commercial speech ... may be more easily verifiable by
its disseminator than . . . news reporting or political commentary, in
that ordinarily the advertiser seeks to disseminate information about a
specific product or service that he himself provides and presumably
knows more about than anyone else.
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The special impact theory provides a promising basis for
FCC regulation of televised news. Admittedly, the use of the the-
ory leaves some issues up in the air. While the theory is used to
reach the holdings in Banzhaf and Democratic National Committee,
these cases upheld FCC interpretations, of the use of the Fairness
Doctrine, which is no longer FCC policy. Further court holdings
would be crucial to understanding the contours of the theory of
democratic equality or participation that appears to underlie the
special impact theory. As I have argued here, we can learn
enough from these opinions to analogize their reasoning to
affirm an FCC policy that promotes standards designed to ensure
that wealthy or politically connected voices do not dominate the
television medium, because television has a strong impact on
viewers. On the commercial speech analogy, as well, we can
adopt the reasoning that the FCC can impose content regula-
tions where there is a risk that certain commercialized news
products may, by their misleading character, present harm to the
public.
With respect to regulation of televised news, the special
impact theory-if correct-would help solve a very important
problem. Because it is not technology specific, the special
impact theory could sustain FCC regulation across broadcast,
cable, and satellite technologies. The typical cable subscriber at
the moment has little idea that the FCC has authority over the
That is, news reporting provides an example of the kind of speech that is
least appropriate for the commercial speech doctrine, since news is about
inquiring; its truth is difficult to verify. The second rationale for lower protec-
tion for commercial speech is that commercial speech is done for a profit; it is
therefore "hardier" than other forms, and has greater resistance to the chilling
effects of regulation. Va. Pharmacy Bd., 425 U.S. at 772 ("Since advertising is the
sine qua non of commercial profits, there is little likelihood of its being chilled
by proper regulation and foregone entirely."). Kozinski and Banner, in an arti-
cle highly critical of the commercial speech doctrine, use precisely the example
of news as a challenge to the "hardier" justification by showing that profit-mak-
ing enterprises often receive extensive First Amendment protection:
Anyone paying attention to the consolidation of the newspaper indus-
try in recent years will recognize that newspaper publishing is big busi-
ness. A look at the salaries of television anchor people will tell you the
same about news broadcasting. Film producers, book publishers,
record producers-all who engage in their chosen profession for
profit-are fully protected. Profit motive is clearly not a factor very
useful for classifying speech.
Alex Kozinski & Stuart Banner, Who's Afraid of Commercial Speech?, 76 VA. L. REv.
627 , 637 (1990).
Thus, news reporting sets at the extremes: it is among the least "verifiable"
of kinds of information, so the speaker of news receives high First Amendment
protection though the speech is commercial, but nevertheless, the news is also a
highly profitable mode of difficult-to-verify commercial speech.
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content of only a handful of the channels on a cable plan, and
not others. To an increasingly larger number of viewers, the dif-
ferences between broadcast media defined by scarcity and cable
and satellite media that are not hooked to scarcity means little or
nothing in practice. The viewer is potentially impacted by chan-
nels from both categories equally. The special impact theory
would provide a basis for FCC regulation that can close the gap
between the experience of viewers and the authority of the FCC
to regulate content.
B. The Doctrinal Basis for Content Regulation of Televised News
FCC regulation of the content of news-related material is not
new. Quite the contrary; prior to the 1980s, the FCC had a wide
range of policies, the goal of which was to ensure that television
networks carried news programs and that an adequate range of
topics, including several categories related to news and other
public affairs, was met. At the height of such policies, local news
stations were even required to do their own investigation of their
communities in order to learn what news should be covered.
These policies were not always sound, and the FCC has turned
away from most of them. Some, however, were beneficial. It is
worth reviewing some of the major FCC initiatives with an eye to
how they addressed the relation of news, editorials, and advertis-
ing. The FCC, as we will see, has used policies that aimed to limit
the effect of editorial and advertising and to promote categories
of coverage.
Since its inception, the FCC has had clear authority to regu-
late content. In NBC v. United States,86 the Supreme Court
upheld the authority of the FCC to regulate the content of
broadcasting. The Court held that the FCC's powers are "not
limited to the engineering and technical aspects of regulation of
radio communication... . [T] he [Communications Act of 1934]
does not restrict the Commission merely to supervision of the
86. 319 U.S. 190 (1943). NBC clarified several matters regarding FCC
power. First, the Court affirmed the right of the FCC to exercise broad powers
over the broadcasting industry. Second, it affirmed that the public interest
standard is the touchstone of FCC authority to exercise broad regulatory pow-
ers. Third, it held that the public interest standard is not unconstitutionally
vague. Fourth, it offered a scarcity rationale-the notion that regulation is nec-
essary because the airwaves are limited-as justification for the public interest
standard and for content regulation. Finally, the Court ruled that regulations
that may result in license revocation or nonrenewal do not violate broadcasters'
First Amendment rights.
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traffic. It puts upon the Commission the burden of determining
the composition of that traffic."" 7
While the FCC can determine the composition of network
traffic, the Court has acknowledged that the FCC must walk a
"tightrope" to preserve the First Amendment values of the Com-
munications Act of 1934.88 Officially, the power of the FCC
under the public interest standard stops at censorship."9 But, the
Supreme Court has also stated that "of all forms of communica-
tion, it is broadcasting that has received the most limited First
Amendment protection. '
Since the earliest days of broadcasting, Congress and the
courts have permitted the Federal Radio Commission ("FRC")"
and its successor, the FCC, to regulate news, editorials, and
87. NBC, 319 U.S. at 215-16 ("[W]e are asked to regard the Commission
as a kind of traffic officer, policing the wave lengths to prevent stations from
interfering with each other. But the Act does not restrict the Commission
merely to supervision of the traffic. It puts upon the Commission the burden of
determining the composition of that traffic.").
88. Columbia Broad. Sys. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm'n, 412 U.S. 94, 117
(1973).
89. See 47 U.S.C. § 326 (2000) ("Nothing in this chapter shall be under-
stood or construed to give the Commission the power of censorship over the
radio communications or signals transmitted by any radio station, and no regu-
lation or condition shall be promulgated or fixed by the Commission which
shall interfere with the right of free speech by means of radio communica-
tion."). See also Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. at 118 (stating that the Conimis-
sion must "oversee without censoring").
90. FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726, 748 (1978); see also Miami
Herald v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974) (holding that broadcasters are subject
to lower levels of First Amendment protection than newspapers).
91. The FRC preceded the FCC. The federal government first began its
attempt to regulate broadcasting in 1910, with the Wireless Radio Act, which
required steamships within 100 miles of American coasts to maintain radio
equipment and have a skilled operator on board. The Radio Act of 1912
sought to control the use of radio frequencies, but soon the number of radio
broadcasts exceeded available wavelengths, and listeners often received several
broadcasts on the same channel. In response, Herbert Hoover, then Secretary
of Commerce, called a series of conferences on radio from 1922 to 1926. The
courts, however, did not uphold Hoover's use of regulatory authority over radio
yielding from these conferences. By 1926, the federal courts ruled that licen-
sees were not bound by the Secretary's allocations of frequencies or settings of
hours of operation. United States v. Zenith Radio Corp., 12 F.2d 614 (N.D. Ill.
1926). Congress acted to preserve the federal government's ability to regulate
broadcasting. In the Radio Act of 1927, Congress established a comprehensive
regulatory framework for broadcasting, and set up the Federal Radio Commis-
sion (FRC). Radio Act of 1927, 44 Stat. 1162, repealed by Communications Act of
1934, 48 Stat. 1064, 1102. In response to concerns about the fragmentation of
responsibility for regulation within the federal government, Congress enacted
the Communications Act of 1934, establishing the FCC. Communications Act
of 1934, §§ 151-609, 48 Star. 1064 (codified at 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-609 (2000)).
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advertising. The FRC promulgated general principles in pursuit
of the public interest standard that promoted coverage of public
affairs and placed limits on both advertising and editorializing.9 2
In its early years, the FCC entirely prohibited editorials by broad-
casters93 and sought the elimination of commercial advertising.9 4
Over the 1940s, the FCC eased its position on editorials.
The 1949 benchmark In re Editorializing by Broadcast Licensees care-
fully circumscribed the use of editorials by broadcasters with
duties to the public:
Congress had given the FRC authority to regulate for the public interest and
necessity and kept the same language in the Communications Act of 1934.
92. See Statement Made by the Commission on August 23, 1928 Relative
to the Public Interest, Convenience and Necessity, 2 F.R.C. Ann. Rep. 166
(1928), reprinted in DOCUMENTS OF AMERICAN BROADCASTING 127-33 (F. Kahn
ed., 4th ed. 1984). The FRC principles included: (1) A substantial band of
frequencies should be allocated to commercial broadcasting; (2) The Commis-
sion should act to improve radio reception and decrease interference; (3) The
Commission should seek a fair distribution of different kinds of service; (4)
Duplication of programming types should be avoided and use of phonograph
records limited; (5) Advertising should be limited and should be incidental to
"real service"; (6) Station transmitter location should be determined with
respect to station power and population density; (7) Financial responsibility
and past record should be significant license qualifications; (8) Use of radio
frequencies for private messages or viewpoints should be strongly discouraged;
(9) Public announcements (in the press) of station operating schedules should
be encouraged; (10) Broadcasters should not use a transmitter other than the
one licensed; and (11) Licensees should be responsible for maintenance of
transmitters and proper frequencies. Id. The Commission listed several
requirements of the public interest:
[A] mple play for the free and fair competition of opposing views," and
"the tastes, needs and desires of all substantial groups among the lis-
tening public should be met, in some fair proportion, by a well-
rounded program, in which entertainment, consisting of music of
both classical and lighter grades, religion, education and instruction,
important public events, discussions of public questions, weather, mar-
ket reports, and news, and matters of interest to all members of the
family find a place."
In re the Application of Great Lakes Broadcasting Co., 3 F.R.C. Ann. Rep. 32,
33-34 (1929).
93. Mayflower Broad. Corp., 8 F.C.C. 333 (1941). Until recently, editori-
alizing was still prohibited on public television. See FCC v. League of Women
Voters, 468 U.S. 364 (1984) (invalidating FCC ban on editorializing on public
television).
94.' FCC, Public Service Responsibility of Broadcast Licensees (Mar. 7, 1946)
("Blue Book"), reprinted in DOCUMENTS OF AMERICAN BROADCASTING, supra note
92, at 149-63. The Blue Book did not have the force of law, but specified four
areas of emphasis: (1) carrying sustaining programs; (2) carrying local live pro-
grams; (3) carrying programs devoted to public discussion; (4) eliminating
commercial advertising expenses. The FCC used these standards to help evalu-
ate the license renewals of broadcasters.
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It is axiomatic that one of the most vital questions of mass
communication in a democracy is the development of an
informed public opinion through the public dissemination
of news and ideas concerning the vital public issues of the
day .... The Commission has consequently recognized the
necessity for licensees to devote a reasonable percentage of
their broadcast time to the presentation of news and pro-
grams devoted to the consideration and discussion of pub-
lic issues of interest in the community served by the
particular station. And we have recognized, with respect to
such programs, the paramount right of the public in a free
society to be informed and to have presented to it for
acceptance or rejection the different attitudes and view-
points concerning these vital and often controversial issues
which are held by the various groups which make up the
community.
9 5
The FCC argued that these restrictions on broadcasters were
constitutional because the First Amendment did not allow broad-
casters "to exclude the expression of opinions and ideas" with
which they disagreed.9 6 The public is the boss: "[I] t is this right
of the public to be informed, rather than any right on the part of
the Government, any broadcast licensee or any individual mem-
ber of the public to broadcast. . . which is the foundation stone
of the American system of broadcasting."9 7  Paradoxically, the
First Amendment could only be fully satisfied by "giving prece-
dence to the right of the American public to be informed on all
sides of public questions over any such individual exploitation
for private purposes."9
The Fairness Doctrine developed out of Editorializing as a
way of monitoring the use of editorials by broadcasters.9 9 The
Fairness Doctrine included two requirements. First, it required
coverage of important public issues. Three factors help deter-
mine whether an issue was of public importance: (1) the impact
the issue was likely to have on the community at large; (2) the
degree of attention the issue had received from government offi-
95. Editorializing by Broad. Licensees, 13 F.C.C. Rep. 1246, 1249 (1949)
[hereinafter Editorializing].
96. Id. at 1256.
97. Id. at 1249.
98. Id. at 1257.
99. Id. at 1246. The Fairness Doctrine was an FCC doctrine, not a con-
gressional mandate. Congress made reference to the doctrine, but did not cod-
ify it. See 47 U.S.C. § 315(a), 73 Stat. 557 (1959). But see Telecomm. Research
& Action Ctr. v. FCC, 801 F.2d 501, 517-18 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (holding that
§ 315(a) did not codify the Fairness Doctrine).
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cials and community leaders; and (3) the amount of media cover-
age devoted to the issue.' 0 0
The second requirement was known as the Cullman Doc-
trine, and it required a broadcaster to air an opposing viewpoint
to a controversial issue presented during its broadcast. 1 ' The
FCC required a licensee to offer time for a response within seven
days after a broadcast personally attacked an individual, or when
the station editorially endorsed a political candidate. Addition-
ally, the broadcaster was required to provide materials, such as a
transcript, to the attacked individual in order to facilitate a
response.
According to the FCC, the Fairness Doctrine served the pub-
lic interest in three ways. First, in light of the limited availability
of broadcast frequencies and the resultant need for government
licensing, the licensee is a public fiduciary, obligated to present
diverse viewpoints representative of the community at large.0 2
The need to effectuate the right of the viewing and listening pub-
lic to suitable access to the marketplace of ideas justified restric-
tions on the rights of broadcasters. Second, a governmentally
imposed restriction on the content of programming is the best
mechanism by which to vindicate this public interest.' Third,
as a factual matter, the Fairness Doctrine, in operation, has the
effect of enhancing the flow of diverse viewpoints to the pub-
lic.'0 4 Through the Fairness Doctrine, the FCC limited broad-
casters' autonomy both by requiring them to find out what news
the public needed and to broadcast it, and by requiring broad-
casters to provide free air time to views treated critically in the
presentation of news.
In 1969, the Supreme Court upheld the Fairness Doctrine
based on the theory that because airwaves are scarce and access
to them limited, the government has an interest in assuring that
opposing viewpoints of important issues were heard.'0 5 Broad-
casters argued that the continued enforcement of the Fairness
Doctrine may lead to self-censorship, because broadcasters would
simply decline to air issues rather than air opinions with which
they disagreed. In response, the Court strongly affirmed that the
100. 1974 Fairness Report, 48 F.C.C.2d at 11, 12 (1974).
101. Cullman Broad. Co. v. FCC, 40 F.C.C. 576 (1963).
102. Gen. Fairness Doctrine Obligations of Broad. Licensees, 102
F.C.C.2d 145, 146-47 (1985).
103. Id. at 147.
104. Id.
105. Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969); CBS v. Democratic
Nat'l Comm'n, 412 U.S. 94 (1973).
REGULATING TELEVISED M.?WS
First Amendment not only permits, but compels the FCC to
ensure adequate coverage of news:
[I]f present licensees should suddenly prove timorous, the
Commission is not powerless to insist that they give ade-
quate and fair attention to public issues. It does not violate
the First Amendment to treat licensees given the privilege
of using scarce radio frequencies as proxies for the entire
community, obligated to give suitable time and attention
to matters of great public concern. To condition the
granting or renewal of licenses on a willingness to present
representative community views on controversial issues is
consistent with the ends and purposes of those constitu-
tional provisions forbidding the abridgment of freedom of
speech and freedom of the press. Congress need not stand
idly by and permit those with licenses to ignore the
problems which beset the people or to exclude from the
airways anything but their own views of fundamental ques-
tions. The statute, long administrative practice, and cases
are to this effect.' 0 6
Thus, the Court largely reaffirmed the vision of Editorializing.
the scarcity rationale, compounded by a concern over manage-
rial censorship (broadcasters' "own views of fundamental ques-
tions"), was sufficient to sustain the FCC's authority to consider
whether broadcasters maintained adequate news coverage when
renewing licenses.
The FCC established categories of coverage to help evaluate
whether a broadcaster's programming was adequate. In 1960,
after nineteen days of hearings and testimony from over ninety
individuals, the FCC issued its Programming Policy Statement,
listing fourteen categories that licensees should meet, describing
them as "[t] he major elements usually necessary to meet the pub-
lic interest, needs, and desires.' 7 The 1960 Programming State-
ment did not have the force of law, but it advised coverage of
public affairs, political and news programs, and permitted edito-
106. Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 393-94.
107. En Banc Programming Inquiry, 44 F.C.C. 2203, 2314 (1960) [herein-
after 1960 Programming Statement]. The categories included: (1) opportunity for
local self-expression; (2) the development and use of local talent; (3) programs
for children; (4) religious programs; (5) educational programs; (6) public
affairs programs; (7) editorialization by licensees; (8) political broadcasts; (9)
agricultural programs; (10) news programs; (11) weather and market reports;
(12) sports programs; (13) service to minority groups; and (14) entertainment
programming. The FCC used these programming guidelines as standards to
evaluate licenses. See, e.g., Cmty. Broad. Co., 12 F.C.C. 85 (1947); Howard W.
Davis, 12 F.C.C. 91 (1947).
2005]
770 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 19
rializing. It also required broadcasters to determine the tastes,
needs, and desires of the community and design programs in
accordance with them. By 1971, this policy turned into formal
ascertainment requirements.1"8 Broadcasters had to specify how
community needs would be met. In 1975, the FCC issued further
ascertainment rules, requiring that broadcasters conduct annual
interviews with members of the public and leaders of significant
community groups. The lists of concerns culled from these inter-
views, and broadcasters' efforts to meet them, were considered at
license renewal time.10 9
By the late 1970s, the FCC reached the limits of its use of
programming categories. In a 1977 opinion, the FCC rejected a
proposal to base license renewal on a set of required quantitative
minimums for news, public affairs, and local programming.'-
Previously, the FCC had been using a standard where if a renewal
applicant could show in a hearing with a competing applicant
that its programming service during the proceeding license term
was "substantially attuned to meeting the needs and interests of
the public served by its station, and that the operation of the
station has not otherwise been characterized by serious deficien-
cies," then the renewal of the applicant is preferred over the new-
comer, and the application for renewal is granted."' These
comparative renewal hearings became bloated, however, pushing
the FCC to consider proposals for quantitative criteria. The
quantitative criteria would specify percentages of airtime that
must be devoted to local programming, news, and public affairs
programming.1 1 2
Formulation of Policies raised several sound objections to the
use of quantitative criteria. First, the Commission reasoned that
there will be many borderline disputes about whether an appli-
cant has met specified standards. Also, there will be arguments
about whether failure in one category amounts to insubstantial
public service sufficient to lead to license denial. It will remain
108. Primer on Ascertainment of Cmty. Problems by Broad. Applicants,
27 F.C.C.2d 650 (1971).
109. Ascertainment of Cmty. Problems by Broad. Applicants, 57 F.C.C.2d
418 (1975).
110. Report and Order, Formulation of Policies Relating to the Broad.
Renewal Applicant, Stemming From the Comparative Hearing Process, 66
F.C.C.2d 419 (1977) [hereinafter Formulation of Policies].
111. Formulation of Policies, 66 F.C.C.2d at 420.
112. The particular proposal at issue set targets of 10-15% of broadcast-
ing effort for local programming (including 10-15% of prime time), 8-10% for
news for the network affiliate and 5% for the independent VHF station (with
the same percentages of prime time), and 3-5% for public affairs program-
ming, with 3% used for prime time). Id. at 421.
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necessary to engage in qualitative evaluation of programs, not
simply percentages of program composition. The requirements,
the Commission continued, would "artificially increase the time
most television stations devote to local, news, and public affairs
programming." The result is more than the FCC desired, and it
would be imprudent to "impose on broadcasters a national stan-
dard of performance in place of independent programming
decisions attuned to the particular needs of the communities
served"; the standards would not produce any significant
improvement in the quality or efficiency of our comparative
renewal hearing process, and may even have the effect of compli-
cating it further.11 On the whole, quantitative standards based
on percentage of programs dedicated to different categories are
"a simplistic, superficial approach to a complex problem." '114
The Commission determined that it was best to continue to use
its case-by-case approach, with a presumption built in for success-
ful past performance. The decision not to use quantitative cate-
gories for license renewal made it easier for licensees to gain
renewal.
Importantly, the FCC turned away from the use of quantita-
tive category-based standards as a matter of policy, not because
the First Amendment forbade it from using them.' This close
consideration of quantitative category-based programming stan-
dards may have marked the apex of the FCC's efforts at content
regulation. From the late 1970s, the FCC began to move rapidly
away from such regulation.
Over the course of the 1980s, most of the FCC content
restrictions on editorializing and guidelines for programming
were axed. In 1981, the FCC eliminated programming guide-
lines for radio. 16 Three years later, the FCC eliminated pro-
gramming guidelines for television licensees as well.1 17 In one
fell swoop the FCC determined that the public interest would be
served by (1) eliminating guidelines relating to non-entertain-
ment programming and amounts of commercial matter
presented by commercial stations; (2) deleting rules relating to
113. Id. at 428-29.
114. Id. at 429.
115. Id. at 427.
116. Deregulation of Radio, 84 F.C.C.2d 968 (1981).
117. Revision of Programming and Commercialization Practices, Report
and Order, 98 F.C.C.2d 1076 (1984). When the FCC abandoned ascertainment
requirements in 1984, it junked the Blue Book categories.
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formalized community ascertainment; and (3) maintaining com-
prehensive program logs by stations.1 'B
The FCC provided several reasons for the elimination of
these programming guidelines. First, with respect to program-
ming guidelines, the FCC concluded that the removal of the sys-
tem where broadcasters were compelled to present prescribed
amounts of programming in each of the traditional categories
would permit individual broadcasters to be "more directly
responsive to existing market forces."' 19 Licensees would still be
required to maintain quarterly issues or programs lists as a means
of providing the public and the Commission with information
necessary to monitor licensees' performances. The FCC believed
that this "issue-responsive" framework would allow broadcasters
more flexibility, while retaining some guidance. Any of the cate-
gories contained in the 1960 Programming Statement would be
characterized as issue-responsive, and thus broadcasters would
still be rewarded for addressing those issues.1
20
The Commission removed the requirement that broadcast-
ers undertake formalized ascertainment of local community con-
cerns in order to keep their licenses. The rationale behind the
ascertainment policy is that broadcasters could better figure out
what served the public interest without having to take direct gui-
dance from the government. The FCC pronounced the ascer-
tainment "not successful,"1 21 because the benefits did not justify
the costs of the procedure: "Broadcasters do not operate in a vac-
uum and, as discussed above, it is in the economic best interest of
the licensee to stay informed about the needs and interests of its
community."122
118. In re Revision of Programming and Commercialization Policies,
Ascertainment Requirements, and Program Log Requirement for Commercial
Television Stations, 98 F.C.C.2d 1076 (1984). These rules were challenged by
numerous minority and citizens groups. On reconsideration the FCC stuck by
its new rules, finding that "market incentives will ensure the presentation of
programming that responds to community needs." Id. 2.
119. Id. 7. The guidelines for renewal application required Commiss-
ion action on any application that proposed: (1) greater than 85% commercial
programming; (2) less than 5% local live programming; (3) greater than 90%
network programming; (4) less than 10% sustaining programming between
6-11 pm; (5) greater than an average of 12 commercial spots during an hour;
(6) no programming in entertainment, religious, agricultural, educational,
news, discussion unless adequate explanation was given. Note that it was propos-
als that were reviewed, not past performance. The FCC declined to use quanti-
tative standards in review of past performance in 1977. See Formulation of Policies,
66 F.C.C.2d 419 (1977).
120. 98 F.C.C.2d 1076, 14 (1984).
121. Id. 19.
122. Id. 54.
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The FCC dismantled the Fairness Doctrine, even over the
will of Congress. In 1984, the FCC invited comments on the
repeal of the Doctrine and, based on the comments, concluded
that the Fairness Doctrine was unconstitutional and no longer
served the public interest.12 The FCC concluded that the inter-
est of the listening and viewing public in obtaining access to
diverse and antagonistic sources of information no longer
required the Fairness Doctrine. The interest of the public in
viewpoint diversity was served by the multiplicity of voices in the
marketplace. Congress responded by passing legislation to cod-
ify the Fairness Doctrine, but it was vetoed by President Reagan.
In 1987, the FCC officially abolished the Fairness Doctrine on
the grounds that it violated the First Amendment and no longer
served the public interest."14 With this, the FCC had largely
removed its news-related programming content regulations.
I re-emphasize that when the FCC decided to lift its stan-
dards for content regulation in the late 1970s and early 1980s, it
did so for policy reasons, and not because the courts found First
Amendment violations. The deregulators thought that markets
would provide answers. With respect to news, markets have
opened up new vistas-especially the 24-hour cable news net-
works-and filled them with the news/ed/ad mixture.
In response to the current news/ed/ad mixture, it is not
prudent simply to swing the pendulum the other direction. Past
FCC doctrine provides a record of what had worked prior to the
enthusiasm for deregulation in the 1980s, but it does not provide
a perfect analogy to the effort to regulate televised news. The
FCC limited editorializing, limited advertising of news, and used
mandatory categories as ways to improve the quality and extent
of newsgathering. But, the 1977 Foundation of Policies opinion
rejecting quantitative categories helps define the limits of what
may be possible for the use of category-based standards of news
coverage. Categories for coverage need to have a fair amount of
flexibility to avoid the creation of "fake" news in order to meet
standards. Also, the news/ed/ad mixture needs to be countered
by the use of guidelines for categories of news issue topics. In
the 1960 Programming Statement, "news" is itself a category. Thus,
the proposal for regulating televised news requires more specific
kinds of content regulation than previously used.
123. General Fairness Doctrine Obligations, 49 Fed. Reg. 20,317 (May 19,
1984) (notice of inquiry); Fairness Doctrine Obligations, 102 F.C.C.2d 143, 157
(1986).
124. Syracuse Peace Council v. WTVH, 2 F.C.C.R. 5043, 5057 (1987).
2005]
774 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 19
The ascertainment policy and the first prong of the Fairness
Doctrine (requiring broadcasters to find out what is newsworthy)
promoted newsgathering. The need for the ascertainment poli-
cies and the Fairness Doctrine has probably evaporated with con-
cerns over scarcity. The problem is no longer that there are not
enough channels on which to present enough news, or that too
many difficult choices need to be made. The problem is that
there are too many incentives to fill news channel time with edi-
torial opinion and advertising of news, rather than the fruits of
newsgathering. The need to promote newsgathering within tele-
vision, the "paramount public medium," has not changed.
Today there are more news outlets and more coverage, but
the basic regulatory goal remains. There is still a need to push
news outlets to find and report news. The challenge in past
decades was to make sure that broadcasters did not replace or
minimize news coverage for the sake of non-news items such as
entertainment shows. The challenge now is to make sure that
outlets beat back the thick brush of editorial programming and
advertising of news and ensure that there are adequate vistas for
the reporting of "pure" news on a sufficiently wide range of news
issues.
C. Minimizing the Risks of Governmental Censorship
The most common criticism of the idea that the FCC should
regulate televised news is that it will lead to government censor-
ship. This is a weighty criticism. The deregulators of media,
committed to this view, fostered a market in which news agencies
compete vigorously. Some find that this results in a press that
brings more news to more people. This is how it was supposed to
work.
As I have argued here, one product of deregulation has
been the trend toward the news/ed/ad mixture. Particularly
with the growth of cable news networks, there is competition to
fill 24-hour program schedules for news. Paradoxically, these vis-
tas for news products have been filled with editorial and advertis-
ing products whose pull and popularity has had the effect of
narrowing the scope of issues covered. With more channels fill-
ing more time, there is a new constellation of managerial choices
for news outlets to make. These choices are made in highly com-
petitive markets where viewers evince preferences whose sum is
not always responsible or beneficial news coverage.
In this environment, the risk of managerial censorship is
every bit as much of an ongoing risk as governmental censorship.
That is, the managerial choices of the media outlets sometimes
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have the effect of censorship when a network declines to air par-
ticular programs because they are, for example, lewd, politically
objectionable, dull, or unprofitable. The news/ed/ad mixture
confronts managers with profound temptations to censor. The
effort to appeal to a particular demographic can provide reasons
to pre-select news to fit editorial programs and advertisements, in
an effort to attract or keep a group of viewers. Where a news
outlet understands that its viewers are partisan, there are tempta-
tions to exclude views that will irk viewers. When revenues are
considerable,1 25 and thirty-six percent of viewers state that they
watch a news channel to listen to views with which they agree,
there are clear incentives to exclude particular views.12 6 There
are temptations to follow news of the rich and powerful to the
exclusion of the poor and marginalized. Programming moves
easily between commercial advertisements and news about those
who have money to buy. As the wings of the companies that own
news outlets span wider and wider, there is greater temptation to
run stories on issues that concern "in house" enterprises.
The public's choice is not whether to suffer governmental
censorship or not. The choice is between governmental regula-
tion (with its risks of state censorship) or the outcomes of private
competition (with its risks of managerial censorship). Some have
tried to develop a theory of when the government is justified in
limiting the effects of managerial censorship. For example,
Owen Fiss has offered a theory that favors governmental limits on
managerial autonomy where those limits can help citizens exer-
cise their "democratic prerogative":
Under the managerial censorship theory . . . [the auton-
omy of media organizations] is conceived as serving only
instrumental purposes: it exists so that citizens may learn
what they need to know to exercise their democratic pre-
rogative properly. The theory recognizes that the exercise
of managerial control can sometimes interfere with the
achievement of this end. Thus, the desirability of media
125. The 24-hour networks have enjoyed sharp increases in the prices for
ads in the past few years. See PEJ, supra note 1, at 19 (reporting that CNN
earned $351 million in 2003, Fox earned $96 million, and MSNBC was pro-
jected to earn $3.1 million). Broadcast network news remains a "robust genera-
tor of revenues." Id. at 15 (reporting that NBC, CBS, and ABC took in $500
million in revenue in 2003, while morning news programs took in more than a
billion dollars for those networks in 2002).
126. Pew Study, supra note 5, at 35.
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autonomy becomes entirely contingent upon how the
media serves the informational needs of the public. 12 7
Thus, the proper role of government includes using media
outlets "instrumentally" in order to make sure that the public
learns what it needs to learn. The special impact theory elabo-
rated earlier, however it is ultimately refined, would harbor a
view of why government regulation is justified in limiting mana-
gerial censorship, even at the risk of government censorship, that
resonates with Fiss's argument.
There is certainly potential for government censorship in
both the effort to partition the news/ed/ad mixture and to
widen the scope of news issue coverage. The standards for keep-
ing news distinct from editorial and advertising will be put in
question. One person's news on events of environmental
destruction is another's editorial. One person's misleading, sen-
sationalist advertisement for news coverage of the war in Iraq is
another's useful information about network coverage of the
event.
The risks of government censorship in content regulation
can be minimized by (1) ensuring that content standards are
appropriately enforced by the FCC's licensing mechanism given
by Congress to the FCC in the Communications Act of 1934; (2)
learning from mistaken doctrines that were incommensurate
with the licensing doctrine; and (3) making inventive use of vol-
untary cooperation between television outlets.
1. Renewed Commitment To License Renewal
The FCC has been very hesitant to use its "stick," the revoca-
tion of broadcaster licenses, in order to enforce public interest
obligations. The few instances of refusal to renew have followed
particular instances of misconduct, rather than a failure of a
licensee to meet a set of content-based standards that are com-
mensurate with the licensing scheme."a S The length of licenses
has grown too long, and their renewal too easy.
The public has an interest in avoiding frequent turnover of
licensees, but the FCC has flexibility in how it may enforce public
127. Fiss, supra note 6, at 1224. Fiss does not expressly advocate the spe-
cial impact theory.
128. See, e.g., Robinson v. FCC, 334 F.2d 534 (D.C. Cir. 1964) (affirming
refusal to renew license for misrepresentations in license renewal proceeding,
but not for other issues, which included licensee's allocation of a substantial
amount of programming to off-color remarks); Brandywine-Main Line Radio,
Inc. v. FCC, 473 F.2d 16 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (upholding first FCC denial of license
renewal for failure to comply with Fairness Doctrine).
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interest obligations. It can use this flexibility to balance the inter-
ests of stability in programming with service interests in a wide
scope of news issue coverage. The Telecommunications Act of
1996 extended television broadcast licenses from five to eight
years. 12 9 At the end of this term, the FCC may grant renewal if
the "public interest, convenience and necessity would be served
thereby."1 3 0 The renewal application is the size of a postcard and
the process is not an occasion for serious consideration of
whether public interest obligations have been fulfilled, and
whether a licensee has a plan for improving in its service to the
public interest.1 3" ' The FCC possesses tools to change licensee
behavior short of issuing the "death penalty" of license revoca-
tion.1 3 2 The Commission may issue enforcement letters or "cease
and desist" orders.1 33 An attractive option for the FCC is its abil-
ity to grant licenses for a term shorter than eight years.' For
example, rather than revoking a license, the FCC could grant it
for one year, causing a licensee to focus its efforts.
Optimally, the FCC would develop an application process
that reviews licensees' public obligations and pegs the length of
their license to the FCC's concern over a licensee's unwillingness
to serve the public.
2. A Turn Away from Pursuit of Discrete Violations
The public interest standard is used most effectively when
the standards for license renewal are appropriate to the penalty
of license renewal or abbreviation. The FCC should regulate for
content so long as it finds a balance appropriate to the license
renewal mechanism. In Banzhaf the D.C. Circuit described this
balance:
[I]n applying the public interest standard to program-
ming, the Commission walks a tightrope between saying
too much and saying too little. In most areas it has
resolved this dilemma by imposing only general affirmative
129. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 203, 110
Stat. 56, 112 (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 307(c)) (2000).
130. Id.
131. See 47 U.S.C. § 309(k) (1) (2000) (making license renewal contin-
gent on whether applicant has (1) served the public interest; (2) committed no
serious violations of the Communications Act or of FCC rules and regulations;
and (3) not committed other violations of the Act or FCC rules and regulations
that would constitute a "pattern of abuse").
132. See 47 U.S.C. § 312(a) (7) (2000) (permitting revocation of a
license).
133. 47 U.S.C. § 312(b) (2000).
134. 47 U.S.C. § 307(c)(1) (2000).
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duties-e.g., to strike a balance between the various inter-
ests of the community, or to provide a reasonable amount
of time for the presentation of programs devoted to the
discussion of public issues. The licensee has broad discre-
tion in giving specific content to these duties, and on appli-
cation for renewal of a license it is understood the
Commission will focus on his overall performance and
good faith rather than on specific errors it may find him to
have made. In practice, the Commission rarely denies
licenses for breaches of these duties. Given its long-estab-
lished authority to consider program content, this general
approach probably minimizes the dangers of censorship or
pervasive supervision.1 35
The balance described here is appropriate: the FCC should
impose only "general affirmative duties." Particularly with
respect to content regulation, the FCC should seek standards
that fit the real scheme of enforcement that it is prepared to use.
It is likely improper to revoke a license for failure to meet strict
quantitative measures for categories of programming, because of
the tough problems of drawing those categories. A review of
overall performance and good faith are appropriate, even for
license terms of three or four years. Where good faith is not evi-
dent, the FCC may grant shorter "probationary" licenses to help
enforce observance of content-based public interest obligations.
When the FCC turns away from regulations that are com-
mensurate with the licensing mechanism, trouble usually follows.
There are three examples that come to mind: the Fairness Doc-
trine, the distortion policy, and the policing of indecency and
obscenity.
Recall that the Fairness Doctrine included two obligations.
The first obligation was to cover important news. This obligation
was enforced erratically.13 6 It also had a circular quality to it. A
problem became a problem because it was a problem: broadcast-
ers were expected to cover events because they had the attention
of community leaders, but they often had the attention of com-
munity leaders because they were newsworthy for broadcasters.
Though this obligation was generally beneficial, many important
but less controversial news issues were still neglected.
The Culman Doctrine's obligation to provide air time to indi-
viduals attacked by editorials had a similar limiting effect. The
135. Banzhaf v. WTRF-TV, Inc., 405 F.2d 1082, 1095 (1968) (citations
omitted).
136. Bill Chamberlin, The FCC and the First Principle of the Fairness Doctrine:
A History of Distortion and Neglect, 31 FED. COMM. L.J. 361 (1979).
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doctrine was only invoked where an issue had already gained the
attention of newscasters, so this did little to extend coverage to
issues of the poor and marginalized. Furthermore, the rule
involved the FCC in enforcement of many discrete violations.
Clever individuals or parties could exploit the rule. 3 ' Enforce-
ment of the rule required the FCC to step into the middle of too
many messy political disputes that it could not easily resolve
through the sanction of loss of license. 3 "
Another example of a policy that is incommensurate with
the licensing mechanism is the FCC's policy on distortion or sup-
pression of news.13 9 The FCC has attempted, through its policy
against distortion and suppression of news, to investigate broad-
cast news programs on the basis of viewer complaints of bias, and
staging or rigging the news.' 4 ' The effort has been largely fruit-
less.141 The FCC has given the policy "extremely limited
137. The dispute that led to Red Lion involved a station that ran religious
right broadcasts. After an on-air guest, Billy Hargis, gave a speech highly critical
of a leftist journalist, the owner of the station refused to allow free access to the
criticized journalist. The journalist in question, Fred Cook, wrote a book label-
ing Barry Goldwater, Johnson's opponent, an "extremist" on the right. Report-
edly, the Democratic strategists launched Cook's work, sending copies of it to
fight wing radio stations. The plan was twofold. Either Cook's polemics would
get exposure in key markets through the exercise of the Fairness Doctrine, or
fight wing radio stations would decline to carry programs critical of it, out of
distaste for having to carry the other side. See FRED FRIENDLY, THE GOOD Guys,
THE BAD Guys, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 38 (1975). In the early 1960s, the
Democratic National Committee prepared kits explaining "how to demand
time under the Fairness Doctrine" and handed them out at conferences. Id. at
35. Used to answer conservative critics in the lead-up to the election of Presi-
dent Johnson, the Democrats garnered 1,678 hours of free airtime. Id. at 39.
138. See, e.g., Columbia Broad. Sys. v. Dem. Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94
(1973).
139. Like the Fairness Doctrine, the distortion policy was born of the
1949's Editorializing "A licensee would be abusing his position as a public trus-
tee .. .were he to withhold from expression over his facilities relevant news or
facts concerning a controversy or to slant or distort the presentation of such
news." Editorializing by Broad. Licensees, 13 F.C.C. Rep. 1246, 1246-47
(1949). In a case involving an erroneous claim by CBS in part of a documen-
tary, the FCC remarked that "[r]igging or slanting the news is a most heinous
act against the public interest-indeed, there is no act more harmful to the
public's ability to handle its affairs." In re Complaints Covering CBS Program
"Hunger in America", 20 F.C.C.2d 143, 151 (1969).
140. Lili Levi, Reporting the Official Truth: The Revival of the FCC's News Dis-
tortion Policy, 78 WASH. U. L.Q. 1005 (2000); Chad Raphael, The FCC's Broadcast
News Distortion Rules: Regulation by Drooping Eyelid, 6 COMM. L. & POc'V 485
(2001).
141. Levi, supra note 140, at 1016 n.33; see also Timothy B. Dyk & Ralph E.
Goldberg, The First Amendment and Congressional Investigations of Broadcast
Programing, 3J.L. & POL. 625 (1987) (arguing that even without direct legisla-
tion regulating broadcasts, Congress as a whole, in committees or individual
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scope."'142 The Commission has rejected what it envisions to be a
censor's role: "[I]n this democracy, no Government agency can
authenticate the news, or should try to do so. We will therefore
eschew the censor's role, including efforts to establish news dis-
tortion in situations where Government intervention would con-
stitute a worse danger than the possible rigging itself."14 ' The
claim that a program has "slanted" or "rigged" the news has not
been successfully extended to include the more general idea that
the news is biased, or that news outlets systematically suppress
issues. The Commission has given the least credence to argu-
ments regarding overall programming suppression and bias.' 44
The distortion policy suffers from several problems. While
the problem of slanting, rigging, or falsification of particular
news items is outrageous, is it not a wise use of the FCC's powers
and resources. Journalist ethics adequately address, in principle,
the appropriate modes of conduct and even the underlying rea-
sons for news distortion.' 4 5 Because the distortion policy hovers
so closely to individual ethics, the FCC has perhaps felt com-
pelled to put in place prohibitively high threshold standards for
complainants. Consequently, few cases are brought, and a negli-
members can exert, via "lifted eyebrow" can abridge First Amendment liberties
by considering broadcast regulations). The FCC has developed something like
a four-part test for finding distortion. First, there must be an accusation of
deliberate intent to distort the news or mislead the audience. The FCC will not
meddle in legitimate editorial decisions of the broadcaster, only act against
"deliberate distortion," rather than simply "mere inaccuracy or difference of
opinion." Second, the complainant must be able to produce "substantial" or
"significant" extrinsic evidence of such deliberate or knowing distortion. This
must include either written or oral instructions from station management to
fabricate or distort the news, evidence of a bribe, outtakes, written memoranda
establishing rigging of news, or testimony from insiders. Third, the actor(s)
doing the distortion must include licensee or top management or news man-
agement. Finally, the distortion must involve a significant matter, not trivial or
incidental. In re Complaints Covering CBS Program "Hunger in America", 20
F.C.C.2d at 151.
142. Galloway v. FCC, 778 F.2d 16, 21 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
143. In re Complaints Covering CBS Program "Hunger in America", 20
F.C.C.2d at 143, 151.
144. See Levi, supra note 140, at 1026 n.81 (listing an extensive record of
cases, many brought on behalf of minorities or women who contend that pro-
gramming relevant to public issues particular to them has been suppressed, in
which the plaintiffs failed to prove distortion or suppression).
145. See, e.g., Society of Professional Journalists, Code of Ethics, at http://
www.spj.org/ethicscode.asp (last visited Apr. 9, 2005) (on file with the Notre
DameJournal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy). The Society of Professional Jour-
nalists ("SPJ") states, "The SPJ Code of Ethics is voluntarily embraced by
thousands of writers, editors and other news professionals. The present version
of the code was adopted by the 1996 SPJ National Convention, after months of
study and debate among the Society's members." Id.
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gible number are heard by the Commission.146 Distortion of
news is one of the places where markets are likely to take care of
most problems. Competitors in the news market are likely to
police one another, eager to publicize gross inaccuracies or false
reporting by one another.
Finally, the policing of indecency and obscenity is the FCC's
most notable current effort to regulate for content across all tele-
vision-broadcast, cable, and satellite. But, the policing of inde-
cency and obscenity illustrates most clearly what happens when
FCC policy ventures from the natural limits and purposes of the
license mechanism. The policing of indecency and obscenity by
the FCC appears-against the wider backdrop of doctrine-
anomalous. The FCC's interest in such matters developed late.
The Communications Act of 1934 did not contain direct sanc-
tions against broadcasters who aired obscene or indecent pro-
grams. Fines levied by the FCC are so sporadic and minimal that
they have little effect.' 4 7 The fines levied by the FCC are incom-
mensurate with the license renewal mechanism. Revoking a
major network's license because of incidents of indecency or
obscenity simply does not seem to fit. Violations so extensive that
they might merit license revocation would seem better suited for
the Justice Department and federal criminal codes.
14 8
The regulation of televised news should avoid the pitfalls
demonstrated by the FCC's efforts to use the Fairness Doctrine,
to employ a distortion policy, and to police for indecency and
obscenity. None of these are natural applications of the license
renewal mechanism that Congress gave to the FCC. The FCC
cannot reasonably revoke a television station's license for a single
failure to provide air time for a fair response, or for a single inci-
dent of distortion. When it uses fines for enforcement, as it does
in policing indecency and obscenity, the FCC risks becoming a
moral tribunal. The public eye looks to the FCC whenever
146. Raphael, supra note 140, at 500 n.69, (citing BARRY G. COLE & MAL
OETTINGER, RELUCTrANT REGULATORS: THE FCC AND THE BROADCAST AUDIENCE
123 (1978)). From 1969-72, the Commission found no distortion in thirty-four
cases, and distortion in one. From 1973-76, it found no distortion in forty-
three cases, and distortion in five. From 1969-99, the FCC took only 120 cases,
but found distortion in only on twelve. Raphael, supra note 140, at 502.
147. Fines currently stand at $32,500 per violation. Congress is consider-
ing increasing fines to as much as $500,000 per violation. Similar legislation
failed in the previous Congress. Todd Shields, Congress Moves to Hike Indecency
Fines, ADWEEK, Jan. 26, 2005, available at http://ww.adweek .com/aw/
national/article-display.jsp?vnu.content-id=10 00 7 78 20 8 (on file with the
Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy).
148. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1464-1465 (2000) (criminalizing obscenity); see also
id. § 2251 (2000) (criminalizing child pornography).
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breasts are exposed on television or a radio shock-jock behaves
badly. Congress gives new orders whenever there is a new pres-
sure to protect the children from cussing and dirty movies. Like-
wise, in pursuing "unfair" editorial practices or incidents of
distortion, the FCC risks stepping into perennial debates over
"media bias." With respect to news coverage, the FCC should
focus its efforts on the problem of scope of coverage and pro-
mote general standards that are fitting for the use of the license
renewal mechanism, rather than fines.
3. Voluntary Cooperation Between Televised News Outlets
The effort to develop general standards for content regula-
tion of televised news can be considerably enhanced by the vol-
untary participation of televised news outlets. The Gore
Commission relied heavily on voluntary cooperation between
digital broadcasters as the way to promote public interest obliga-
tions. The more that is done voluntarily, the fewer risks of gov-
ernment censorship are afoot.
Both proposals that I have offered are amenable to develop-
ment by voluntary means. In partitioning the news/ed/ad mix-
ture, it would be useful for the televised news outlets to assist in
developing ways to keep news and editorial apart and clearly
marked. Also, the outlets could reach agreements on standards
for the reduction of, and change in, style of advertising. While
not an ideal model, the networks were able voluntarily to pass
content ratings for non-news programming. They may be able to
do something similar with respect to news coverage. The devel-
opment of categories for news issue coverage is likely to be highly
contentious, and voluntary development of the lists of categories
and policy for implementation would be a boon.
The FCC should consider inventive ways to answer the hard
questions about what constitutes news, what the essential catego-
ries of news are, and what kind of news reporting is appropriate
for particular news items. Outside of the regulatory context,
Geoffrey Cowan, dean of the University of Southern California's
Annenberg School for Communication, has offered a stimulating
proposal that could be put to use here.14 9 Cowan has suggested
that media should be judged by an implicit contract they have
with viewers about the level of accuracy in what they present. For
example, those who watch gossip-based entertainment shows do
not expect that every detail is truth. Likewise, viewers of a docu-
drama might expect a certain measure of license to be taken with
149. Geoffrey Cowan, The Legal and Ethical Limitations of Factual Misrepre-
sentation, 560 ANNALS Am. ACAD. POL. & Soc. ScI. 155 (1998).
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characters-but not too much. By contrast, viewers of business
news programs will expect extremely accurate reporting. This
idea could be put to use in the regulation of television news, by
using the contract model to help figure out what "news" is, in
contrast to editorial or advertising. Also, the contract model
could be used to help determine what standards of reporting are
appropriate for different kinds of news formats.
The FCC could also consider reinvigorating independent
news councils as clearinghouses for voluntary cooperation.1 50
150. In the 1960s and '70s, several state councils were established, and in
1973, the brightest star of success, the National News Council ("NNC"), was
launched. It lasted only until 1984. The NNC emerged from the initiative of
the Twentieth Century Fund. See generally PATRICK BROGAN, SPIKED: THE SHORT
LIFE AND DEATH OF THE NATIONAL NEWS COUNCIL (1985). The Twentieth Cen-
tury Fund still exists as an organization based in New York City. It aspires to
"educate, provoke and develop better answers when evidence and reason show
that public debates are badly off track." Id. at 6. The NNC consisted of fifteen
members representing both the public and the media. It considered com-
plaints against national newspapers, news agencies, magazines, and television
networks. Complainants would waive their right to use any of the council's pro-
ceedings as evidence in court. Id. The NNC staff analyzed complaints and
made initial judgments about their merit. If a complaint was found to have
merit, it was sent to a grievance committee composed of members of the Coun-
cil, which in ttrn, made recommendations to the full Council. The Council
judged the cases and issued verdicts. Over the decade of its existence, the NNC
dealt with 227 complaints. Id. at 38. While its decisions were made public, they
were not widely reported. It had no power of enforcement, but relied on pub-
licity to encourage the press to mend its ways. Brogan found that "[d]espite all
its good intentions and ten years of strenuous endeavor, the council was
spurned by the press and neglected by the public. Without press or public sup-
port, it could win no publicity. Without that, it could not raise the money it
needed to carry on operations-and earn the support of press or public." Id. at
7.
The NNC never successfully gained the support of most of the press. Many
declined to cooperate with the Council, and it never received contributions
from the press industry. This lack of funding was devastating, since to do its job
effectively, the Council had, effectively, to re-report a story, expending consid-
erable resources, including experienced journalists. Perhaps the NNC and
other press councils were too ambitious in their aspiration to reign in press
industry and undertake extensive reviews of complaints. In my model, the com-
plaint procedure would be used, but it would not be central. Rather, the focus
of the news Council would rest in articulating and publishing standards for dif-
ferent varieties of news reporting. Ideally, the Council might arrive at a list of
standards by which it could issue evaluations of news agencies. By gaining merit
or demerits, a news agency can change its rating over time. Complaints could
be received, reviewed, and depending on resources, pursued in order to gain
insight into standard-making. The Council should try to seek experienced jour-
nalists and television industry executives who are willing to make a commitment
to independence.
An example of one of the few surviving press councils in the United States
is the Minnesota News Council, at http://www.news-council.org/main.html
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While in the past independent news councils served more of a
litigation-centered role, they could take the lead (with FCC
encouragement) in adopting standards for the partition of the
news/ed/ad mixture, and in adopting categories for news cover-
age. Televised news providers could form agreements to accept
these standards as recommendations, and this acceptance could
count toward a good faith showing of compliance with FCC
standards.
As important as it is to explore efforts at voluntary coopera-
tion, however, the FCC should be ready to reject voluntarily
derived standards if they are inadequate. There is a very real pos-
sibility that the outlets could "capture" the voluntary process. On
the other hand, too much command-and-control content regula-
tion could raise expenses for outlets such that it will drive them
out of the news business, a worse alternative.
To be clear-I think whether televised news should be regu-
lated or not is a false question. The two proposals offered here-
the partition of the news/ed/ad mixture and the use of category-
based standards for news coverage-both present real opportuni-
ties to censor. But, as a result of deregulation, televised news
outlets compete in expanding and competitive markets, and this
competition also provides numerous inducements for news out-
let managers to censor. It is necessary to balance these interests.
To the extent that the FCC sets general, affirmative, good-faith
guidelines that are commensurate with enforcement through the
license renewal mechanism (rather than fines or litigation of dis-
crete instances), the risk of government censorship is minimized.
By seizing on opportunities-perhaps the voluntary agreement
of news outlets to accept content standards developed through
independent news agencies-the risk can be further reduced.
With these reduced risks of censorship, the potential benefit of
rescuing televised news from the managerial censorship inherent
to the news/ed/ad mixture outweighs the dangers of govern-
ment censorship.
The regulation of televised news, in sum, would require the
FCC to reconsider several fundamental issues. This is a time of
change both for television and news media. The television
medium is changing with the transition to digital technology.
The news media is changing with the multiplicity of news media,
particularly the Internet, shifting techniques, and standards for
reporting.15 ' The rise of cable news channels and the phenom-
(last visited Apr. 9, 2005) (on file with the Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics &
Public Policy).
151. See generally PEJ, supra note 1; Pew Study, supra note 5.
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ena I have described here as the news/ed/ad mixture manifest
the ways in which these changes overlap. Unfortunately, these
developments in televised news coverage have been a blind spot
for the FCC.
Shortly, it may not be possible to apply public interest stan-
dards to news carried over cable or satellite. As discussed earlier,
the FCC has only regulated the content of cable television for
indecency and obscenity. Outside of this area, the FCC has
barely been able to catch cable and satellite by the tail, by impos-
ing general public interest obligations on cable and satellite car-
riers, rather than providers of the news channels themselves.
The Supreme Court has held the door open with respect to this
regulation of cable and satellite carriers, 152  though it has
rejected the applicability of the scarcity theory to cable. 5 3 The
rapid pace of technological change makes some members hesi-
152. After initial hesitation, the FCC asserted jurisdiction over cable in
1962. See Carter Mountain Transmission Corp., 32 F.C.C. 459 (1962).
153. The 1992 Cable Act re-imposed "must carry" rules requiring the car-
riage of local broadcast stations or the compensation of broadcast stations for
retransmission of their programming. In Turner Broadcasting v. FCC, the
Supreme Court put to rest the idea that the scarcity doctrine applied to cable
television. Turner Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622 (1994) ("Turner 1")
(refusing to extend Red Lion to cable television). The Court rejected the argu-
ment that "market failure" could be the basis for government regulation of
broadcasting. It is only the "special physical characteristics of broadcast trans-
mission" that underlie the Court's broadcast jurisprudence. Id. at 640. Having
determined that the scarcity doctrine provided no basis for the application of
must-carry rules, the Court applied traditional First Amendment categories in
finding that must-carry rules were content-neutral. Justice Kennedy, writing for
the Court, reasoned:
When an individual subscribes to cable, the physical connection
between the television set and the cable network gives the cable opera-
tor bottleneck, or gatekeeper, control over most (if not all) of the tele-
vision programming that is channeled into the subscriber's home.
Hence, simply by virtue of its ownership of the essential pathway for
cable speech, a cable operator can prevent its subscribers from
obtaining access to programming ....
Id. at 656. The First Amendment does not forbid government from taking steps
to make sure that "private interests not restrict, through physical control of a
critical pathway of communication, free flow of information and ideas." Id. at
657.
The only thing that the courts have made clear so far with respect to cable
and satellite content regulation is that it will not be grounded in the scarcity
doctrine. Turner applied the Court's traditional analysis for content-based regu-
lations to determine whether there is compelling governmental interest and
that a regulation is narrowly tailored. While Kennedy's analysis would seem to
open the door for an analysis of managerial censorship by stressing the gate-
keeper function of cable operators, he was careful to stress that it is the physical
role of censor that is implicated, not editorial censorship.
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tate to set any rules in stone.' 54 The Gore Commission called for
a renewed commitment to the promotion of the public interest
standard for the new age of digital broadcasting,1 55 but it gave no
special attention to the problem of televised news and pre-dated
the rise of the 24-hour news channels.1 56 If the FCC does not
develop standards for televised news coverage across all television
media, it will lose a valuable chance to protect "the public inter-
est" in communications, with which it has been entrusted.
We are still in the era of deregulation. The FCC's philoso-
phy of regulation under the public interest standard has changed
before, however, and it can change again.' 5 7 Congress has dis-
played a continued commitment to the standard.' The recent
Commission has been divided along partisan lines in its enthusi-
asm for finding new ways to employ the public interest stan-
dard.1 59 Especially under Chairman Powell, the FCC exercised
154. In Denver Area, the Court ruled on the validity of portions of the
1992 Cable Act that permitted cable operators to enforce indecency standards.
Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727 (1996). The
Court issued a plurality opinion, in which the Justices differed sharply over
whether the First Amendment permitted editorial discretion by cable providers
to air indecent material. Importantly, the opinions made it clear that the Court
had not reached any decision on how to apply public interest standards to
cable. Justice Breyer, whose opinion controlled the outcome of the case, found
that it was due to the "changes taking place in the law, the technology, and the
industrial structure related to telecommunications" that "no definitive choice
among competing analogies (broadcast, common carrier, bookstore) allows us
to declare a rigid single standard, good for now and for all future media and
purposes." Id. at 741-42. He drew on the pervasive presence argument of
Pacifica to uphold federal law that permitted a cable operator to enforce a pro-
spective ban on indecent material. Id. at 743. Justice Souter also stressed that
the law "all of the relevant characteristics of cable are presently in a state of
technological and regulatory flux . .. we should be shy about saying the final
word today." Id. at 776 (Souter, J., concurring). In dissent, Justice Thomas,
joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia, had no doubts. They
would have preferred that the court give cable the same full protections as the
print media. Id. at 813-14. (ThomasJ., dissenting).
155. See Gore Commission Report, supra note 50, at 46.
156. See supra note 52.
157. See Ervin S. Duggan, Congressman Tauzin's Interesting Idea, BROAD. &
CABLE, Oct. 20, 1997, at S18 (former FCC Chairman noting that "successive
regimes at the FCC have oscillated wildly between enthusiasm for the public
interest standard and distaste for it"); see also Pinellas Broad. Co. v. FCC, 230
F.2d 204, 206 (D.C. Cir. 1956) ("[T]he Commission's view of what is best in the
public interest may change from time to time. Commissions themselves
change, underlying philosophies differ, and experience often dictates
changes.").
158. See, e.g., Telecommunications Act of 1996, passim, Pub. L. No. 104-
104, 110 Stat. 56 (making over 40 references to the public interest standard).
159. The current FCC also reflects political divisions with respect to the
public interest standard. The Commission currently has three Commissioners
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content regulation primarily in the policing of indecency and
obscenity. The problem of televised news raises a moral chal-
lenge: Is the quality and scope of news coverage important
enough to justify a repudiation of at least some of the deregu-
latory angst over content regulation? It also raises a legal chal-
lenge: Will the FCC be bold enough to unhook its policies from
the scarcity rationale, and consider a theory, such as some form
of special impact theory, that would sustain content regulation
across broadcast, cable, and satellite media? The answers to
these questions will tell us much about what is left of the public
interest standard.
with Republican affiliations (Chairman Powell, Abernathy and Martin), and two
Commissioners with Democratic affiliations (Adelstein and Copp). Only the
Commissioners with Democratic affiliations consistently give attention to the
vitality of the public interest standard. In his statement on the FCC's second
period review of its rules on conversion to digital television, Commissioner
Adelstein remarked that "I am puzzled why we have not yet provided broadcast-
ers and the public with a concrete understanding of broadcasters' public inter-
est obligations in the digital age." Separate Statement of Commissioner
Jonathan S. Adelstein, Second Periodic Review of the Commission's Rules and
Policies Affecting the Conversion to Digital Television, Report and Order (Aug.
3, 2004), available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/ edocs.public/attachmatch/
DOC-250542A5.doc (on file with the Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Pub-
lic Policy). He also stated, "Multicasting and other new horizons in digital
broadcasting should correspond to new horizons in serving the public interest."
Id. Commissioner Copps, while also approving the Rules on digital transition,
noted:
The vast majority of television stations are already beginning to broad-
cast in digital and hundreds of stations across the country are multi-
casting. And yet, those broadcasters do not know what they must do to
discharge their public interest obligations on their new channels.
Worse, viewers are equally in the dark. We really can't delay any
longer in bringing some certainty for both broadcasters and the
public.
Statement of Commissioner Michael J. Copps, Second Periodic Review of the
Commission's Rules and Policies Affecting the Conversion to Digital Television
(Aug. 4, 2004), available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocspublic/
attachmatch/DOC-250542A3.doc (on file with the Notre DameJournal of Law,
Ethics & Public Policy). The same emphasis on the need to specify public inter-
est standards was not found in the statements of the Republican Commission-
ers. Commissioner Abernathy, for example, describes her "regulatory
philosophy" as focused on "harnessing the benefits of market-based solutions
rather than relying on prescriptive regulation." Kathleen Q. Abernathy, Guid-
ing Principles for the Age of Convergence, Address at the FBCA Annual Meet-
ing (June 24, 2004). Commissioner Powell quipped, "The night after I was
sworn in, I waited for a visit from the angel of the public interest. I waited all
night, but she did not come." Michael K. Powell, The Public Interest Standard:
A New Regulator's Search for Enlightenment, Address Before the American Bar
Association 17th Annual Legal Forum on Communication Law (Apr. 5, 1998),
available at http://www.fcc.gov/Speeches/Powell/spmkp 806.html (on file with
the Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy).
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CONCLUSION
Televised news has a tremendous capacity to shape public
views of important matters. Done well, televised news exposes
the public to a wide range of issues in as non-partisan a manner
as possible. The trend in televised news, propelled by 24-hour
news channels, is toward a mixture of news, editorial program-
ming, and advertising of those news and editorial items. The
effect of this news/ed/ad mixture is constriction in the scope
and quality of news coverage.
The regulation of televised news will require a new season
for the FCC's use of the public interest standard. The FCC must
unhook public interest regulation from the scarcity doctrine.
The FCC should regulate televised news-in its broadcast, cable,
and satellite forms-on the basis of the special impact of tele-
vised news on viewers in a democracy. FCC regulation is also
needed to minimize managerial censorship. The news/ed/ad
mixture magnifies the effects of managerial censorship of news
coverage, and the impact of such censorship on viewers. Two
proposals can help curb the dangers of managerial censorship by
outlets: (1) the partition of the news/ed/ad mixture; and (2) cat-
egory-based standards for news issue coverage. While these pro-
posals involve content regulation, the risks of government
censorship they pose are less severe than the risks of managerial
censorship manifest in the news/ed/ad mixture. Prior to der-
egulation, the FCC used programming content categories to help
evaluate licenses; it did so without abuse. The FCC also has long
limited the effects of editorial and advertising in television.
License renewal policies that require good faith performance in
meeting standards for televised news coverage are appropriate
and enable the FCC to promote the best uses of televised news
with minimal potential for censorship.
